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Chapter I – Information on futures banks’ stock returns in 
option’s implied volatilities skews and spreads 
By GIULIO ANSELMI 
In this study we focus our attention on how volatility skew – 
measured as the difference between OTM put and ATM call – and 
volatility spread – measured as the difference between ATM call 
and ATM put – affect future equity returns for banking industry. In 
doing so, we perform two different techniques: a regression analysis 
and a portfolio analysis. With the regression analysis we find out 
that volatility skew is negative correlated with future equity returns, 
while volatility spread is positive correlated with future equity 
returns and that short time-to-maturity options are the most 
important contract for shaping future equity returns. In portfolio 
analysis we observe that investing in stock with lower values of 
volatility skew (spread) significantly underperforms a portfolio 
which invests in stock with higher values of volatility skew (spread).  
* Giulio Anselmi, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo Gemelli, 1, Milano, Italy, giulio.anselmi@unicatt.it  
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies how volatility skews and spreads calculated from options 
implied volatilities influence future banks’ stocks returns. The analysis exploits 
two different methods. As a leading method we perform a regression analysis on a 
dataset of weekly banks’ stocks returns and their corresponding implied 
volatilities while as complementary method we perform a portfolio analysis using 
option implied volatility skews and spreads distributions’ to identify banks that 
perform better across time. 
As a robustness check we execute a model full of Fama French [1996] four 
factors model control variables and we use a multivariate regression analysis 
which has the entire term structure of volatility skews (spreads) as exogenous 
variables. A multivariate analysis which uses all time-to-maturity options cleanses 
volatility skews (spreads) coefficients from any correlation among each other, so 
that we can identify which volatility skew (spread) affects more next week 
returns. Lastly, we check life span of future returns predictability in skews 
(spreads) by performing a regression analysis comprehensive of lagged skew 
(spread). In doing so, we extend the array of exogenous variables up to 12 weeks 
lag. 
Options market is a suitable environment for informed traders to operate. It 
offers high leverage, no constrains to short-selling and gives the opportunity but 
not the obligation to buy or sell a specific asset at a specific price within – or at – 
a specific point in time. Thanks to all their features option prices embody traders’ 
expectations on future stock returns and represent a forward looking measure. 
Traders operate in option market by quoting their implied volatilities for 
different maturities and different moneyness according to their view on future 
stock’s returns. The result of this trading activity produces volatility skews, 
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smirks and spreads which eventually get away from Black and Scholes [1973] 
environment of constant volatility and put-call parity equation. 
Option implied volatilities risk measures and their role in forecasting future 
price movements has been already unfolded for stock indices and low regulated 
industries in recent literature. 
Several papers use option implied volatilities skews, spreads and variance risk 
premia as risk measures to construct portfolios of low regulated stocks. In 
studying the relationship between option’s market and firms’ capital structure 
other papers rely on option implied volatility informational content to assess the 
flexibility of a firm in changing its capital structure and its financing sources only 
for non-financial industry but none, to the best of our knowledge, extended this 
analysis for financial industry. 
On one hand banks and financial firms respond to the same profitability and 
economic laws of other industries. On the other hand they present a deeper bond 
with macroeconomic fundamentals and with central banks’ monetary policy 
decisions as well as they operate in a high-regulated environment. Due to the 
nature of their business any association with other industries must be eluded and 
aware of this special requirement we perform the analysis only on banks’ stocks 
and their option implied volatilities. 
Our aim is to investigate whether volatility skews and spread are statistically 
and economically significant for banking industry future stocks returns as much 
as they are for other industries as previous studies highlighted. If this is the case, 
it means that traders convey their views about bank’s economic and financial 
health in option markets prior to expressing it in the underlying asset market and 
option volatility skews analysis is a useful tool in gauge equity future movements. 
In our study, regression analysis provides good evidence that volatility skew 
and volatility spread define future weekly returns and portfolio analysis supports 
this evidence. 
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Volatility skews regression analysis recognizes statistically significant and 
negative coefficients for all short term maturities options (from 1 to 3 months to 
maturity). Skew, which can be defined as the difference between out-of-the-
money (OTM) put and at-the-money (ATM) call option, is negative correlated 
with next week stock return for option time to maturity from 1 up to 3 months, 
with a peak of significance at 2 months’ time-to-maturity. This evidence suggests 
that the intent of traders to pay more for OTM put options is connected with a 
negative return in coming week. 
Volatility spreads analysis offers clear results about the sign of the correlation 
but less straightforward evidence about which is the most important maturity to be 
considered. Spread can be defined as the difference between ATM call and ATM 
put option and it is statistically significant and positive correlated with next week 
stock return for options with time to maturity from 2 up to 12 months. When we 
consider a univariate model, spread tends to show a peak in statistical and 
economic significance for 6 and 12 months’ time-to-maturity options. On the 
contrary, when we add control variables and perform a multivariate analysis using 
the entire spread’s term structure, the relevant contracts are 1 and 2 months’ 
maturity option. So we still identify short term maturities as leading contracts, but 
less certainly than we can state for skews. Considering the sign of the relationship 
a positive correlation between spread and future return witness that any positive 
upward departure from put-call parity conditions produces an increase in stock 
price. 
Results from volatility skew and spread analysis are corroborated by our 
portfolio model. In our model we find that a portfolio which invests in banks’ 
stocks with lower volatility skews (spread) significantly underperforms one 
investing in those with higher volatility skews (spread). In our portfolio analysis 
we rank banks on their option implied volatilities skews (spreads) and build 
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portfolios of stocks according to it. For each skew (spread) we generate four 
portfolio, 1
st
 and 5
th
 quintile and 1
st
 and 10
th
 decile portfolios. 
Portfolios based on left hand side distribution of implied volatility skew 
(spread) underperform those based on the right hand side distribution for all 
maturities and for all considered time frame. Average portfolio returns 
corroborate our findings in regression analysis but statistical significance arises 
irregularly among different portfolios and it is widespread only for 1
st
 quintiles 
portfolios. 
For 90% moneyness level, 1
st
 quintile portfolios show statistically significant 
negative returns for 1, 2, 3 and 6 months maturity options, while for deciles 
portfolios, only those based on 2 months’ time to maturity option implied 
volatility skew, produces statistically significant return of -0.168% per week. 
Volatility spread analysis portfolio model shows strong statistically significance 
for both 1
st
 quintile and 1
st
 deciles, however fails to statistically support volatility 
spread as a measure for upside movement in stock prices and provides evidence 
only for downside movements. Portfolio of stocks which fall in the 1
st
 quintile for 
option implied volatility spread with time to maturity equal to 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 
months show significant negative returns while those which fall in the 1
st
 decile 
show significant negative returns for maturities equal to 3, 6 and 12 months. 
Summing up, regression analysis highlights that volatility skew is negative 
correlated with future stock returns and portfolio analysis indicates a relative 
underperformance of stock with lower skew, supporting the theory that volatility 
skew absorbs traders’ expectation on future drawdowns. Volatility spread 
regression analysis identifies a positive correlation with next week stock returns 
and portfolio analysis identifies a relative underperformance of stocks with lower 
volatility spreads. However, when asked to support volatility spread as a measure 
to capture traders’ expectation for future upside returns, portfolio analysis 
partially succeeds in backing up our findings. 
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This paper is organized as follow, Section 1 is the introduction, Section 2 
presents previous literature related to the topic, Section 3 describes the data and 
the methodology used in the analysis, Section 4 illustrates the results and 
robustness check analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Previous Literature 
Bates [1991] states that the set of index call and put option prices across 
different moneyness levels give a direct indication of market participants’ 
aggregate subjective distribution of future price realizations. Therefore, OTM puts 
become more expensive compared to ATM calls and volatility skews become 
more prominent before big negative jumps in price levels. In his paper shows that 
out-of-the money puts became unusually expensive during the year preceding the 
1987 crash and by setting a model for pricing American option on jump-diffusion 
processes with systematic jump risk is shown that jump-diffusion parameters 
implicit in option prices indicate a crash was expected and that implicit 
distributions were negatively skewed in the year preceding 1987.  
Pan [2002] documents that informational content of volatility smirk for an S&P 
500 index option with 30 days to expiration is 10% on a median volatility day in 
his paper he incorporates both jump risk premium and volatility risk premium and 
shows that investors’ aversion toward negative jumps is the driving force for 
volatility skew. For OTM put options the jump risk premium component 
characterizes 80% of total risk premium while the jump premium for OTM calls 
is just 30% of total risk premium. 
Doran et al. [2007b] use a probit model for all options on S&P 100 from 1996 
to 2002 to demonstrate that the shape of the skew can reveal with significant 
probability when the market will “crash” or “spike”. Their findings suggest that 
there is predictive information content within volatility skew and put-only 
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volatility skew has strong predictive power in forecasting short-term market 
declines. 
Xing et al. [2010] show that implied volatility smirk (defined has the difference 
between the implied volatilities of OTM put options and the implied volatilities of 
ATM call options) is persistent and has significant predictive power for future 
equity returns. In their study stocks exhibiting the steepest smirks in their traded 
options tend to underperform stocks with least pronounced volatility smirks in 
their options by 10.9% per year on a risk-adjusted basis using the Fama and 
French [1996] three-factor model. They also find that predictability of the 
volatility skew on future stock returns last for at least six months and stocks with 
steepest volatility smirks are those stocks experiencing the worst earning shocks 
in the following quarter. 
Cremers and Weinbaum [2010] find that deviations from put-call parity contain 
information about future stock prices. By comparing pairs of call and put they 
discover that stocks with relative expensive calls outperform stocks with relative 
expensive puts by at least 45 basis points per week. 
Liu et al. [2014] further inspect option-implied volatilities informational content 
by investigate the industry effect of portfolio of stocks constructed according to 
implied volatility measure and comparing those portfolios with industry-neutral 
portfolios of stocks. They find that quintile portfolios constructed using volatility 
skew and volatility spread are subject to substantial industry effect and industry-
neutral portfolio over perform. 
Chen, Chung and Wang [2014] propose a forward-looking approach to estimate 
the individual stock moments from option prices and use them as inputs in 
determining optimal portfolios under the mean-variance framework proposed by 
Markowitz [1952]. They found that 80.77% of portfolios relying on option prices 
information outperform those built on stocks historical data and 58.97% of the 
differences are statistically significant at the 5% level, 75.64% of the optimization 
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portfolios constructed with the forward-looking approach outperform the naïve 
diversification and 53.56% of the differences are statistically different from zero 
at the 5% significance level. 
Borochin and Yang [2014] use forward looking risk estimates impounded into 
option prices to create market-based indices which explain the ability to change 
firm’s capital structure more than traditional accounting-based measures. They 
also construct indices using implied volatility spread, implied volatility skew and 
volatility risk premium and perform a long-short trading strategy based on these 
indices which generates abnormal returns from 2.3% to 4.9% over one year. 
Bollerslev, Tauchen and Zhou [2009] provide empirical evidence that stock 
market returns are predictable by the difference between implied volatilities and 
realized volatilities or variance risk premium. Moreover, stock returns are 
positively correlated with variance risk premium and the degree of predictability 
is the largest at quarterly horizons but the premium still explains observed return 
variation at monthly and annual horizons. Volatility risk premium captures risk 
premium for option sellers to bear losses on the underlying stock. 
Goyal and Saretto [2009] study cross-section stock option returns by sorting 
stocks on the difference between historical realized volatility and at-the-money 
implied volatility and find that auto-financing trading strategy that is long (short) 
in the portfolio with a large positive (negative) difference between historical 
volatility and implied volatility produces economically and statistically significant 
monthly returns. They observe that deviations between historical volatility and 
implied volatility are transitory and indicative of option mispricing, hence future 
volatility will converge to its long-run historical volatility. 
Zhou [2009] presents evidence of variance risk premium forecasting ability for 
financial market risk premia across equity, bond, currency and credit asset classes 
and this forecasting ability is maximum at one month horizon. 
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3. Data and Methodology  
Banks are selected from STOXX Global 1800 Banks Index. Among 106 
components of the index we exclude those banks with an incomplete or missing 
array of option prices. The resulting dataset comprehends daily observations from 
January 2005 to December 2014 for 72 banks. For each bank we collect option 
data for different moneyness level and different maturities. We relied on a broader 
dataset, with respect to previous studies, by collecting call and put options with 
moneyness (strike-to-spot ratio) from 0.90 to 1.10, by including option with time-
to-maturity from 1 to 12 months and by performing the analysis separately for 
each time-to-maturity, instead of averaging across them all. Call and put option 
with moneyness close to 1 are defined ATM option, call (put) with moneyness 
equal or above 1.05 (equal or below 0.95) are defined OTM. The approach in 
selecting ATM and OTM moneyness levels is consistent with Ofek, Richardson 
and Whitelaw [2004]. Options and stocks data are obtained from Bloomberg and 
implied volatility prices represent daily average value of market trades. 
Volatility skew is the difference between OTM put and ATM call option 
implied volatility and measures the excess premium paid for purchasing OTM put 
option with respect to ATM call option. Equation (1) defines volatility skew.  
(1) 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝑂𝑇𝑀𝑃,𝑚 − 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐶,𝑚
 
 
where 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝑂𝑇𝑀𝑃,𝑚
 is the implied volatility for an OTM put option, maturity m on 
stock i at time t and 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐶,𝑚
 is the implied volatility for ATM call option with 
maturity m on stock i at time t. A negative and statistically significant coefficient 
for 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 over weekly stock returns would infer that traders use OTM put 
options to hedge for (invest in) those stocks willing to have a drawdowns in price 
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in coming weeks. Different option maturities produce different skews and allow 
us to measure the informational content of skews among different time horizons. 
The selected moneyness is 0.90 and the considered option time to maturity m 
are 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 months, 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤 is computed for each bank on a weekly basis 
by taking the difference between average daily OTM put and ATM call implied 
volatilities over a week (Tuesday close to Tuesday close). Weekly stock returns 
are calculated from Wednesday close to Wednesday close in order to avoid non-
synchronous trading issues as pointed out by Battalio and Schultz [2006].
1
 
Volatility spread is defined in Equation (2) as the difference between ATM call 
option implied volatilities and ATM put option implied volatilities of. 
(2) 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐶,𝑚 − 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑃,𝑚
  
 
where i and t represent the same variables in Eq. (1) and the considered m 
maturities are 10 days, 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 months. Volatility spread aims to capture 
any departure from put-call parity state due to current market condition. Positive 
values of 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑚  are manifestation of a more expensiveness of call option to 
put option, hence traders’ expectation of future positive return on stock i. Positive 
and statistically significant coefficient for 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑚  in a regression analysis on 
weekly stock returns would suggest that 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑚  soaks up market expectations 
for upward movement in stock prices. 
 
 
1
 Using same-day closing price may lead in non-synchronous issues since option market closes at 4:02 PM for 
individual stock options while equity market closes at 4:00 PM. 
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A. Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is performed on a panel dataset of 72 banks from 2005 to 
2014 for a total of 30,000 weekly observations. Equation (3) presents the model 
for volatility skew analysis and Equation (4) presents the model for volatility 
spread analysis: 
(3) 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
(4) 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  represents the weekly log return for bank i, at time t, 𝛼𝑖 is the 
constant, 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 represents the volatility skew as the difference between OTM 
put and ATM call volatility for bank i at time t and option’s time to maturity m, 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑚  represents the volatility spread as the difference between ATM call and 
ATM put volatility for bank i at time t and option’s time to maturity m, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
  is 
a dummy variable equal to one if t happens during financial crisis (from Q3 2007 
to Q1 2009) and zero otherwise, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
  allows to clean our analysis from any 
misbehavior of dependent variable during the financial crisis and 𝐗𝑡
  is a vector of 
control variables from Fama French four factors model. 
Once we studied different time-to-maturity option implied volatility skews 
(spreads) in separate models we perform a multivariate model which 
comprehends, as exogenous variables, the entire term structure of volatility skews 
(spreads). Multivariate analysis is carried out in order to verify which time-to-
maturity skew (spread) affects the most future equity returns and if the results in 
previous analysis are somehow corrupted by correlation among exogenous 
variables. Equations (5) and (6) show the models. 
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(5) 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
(6) 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑺𝑷𝑹𝑬𝑨𝑫𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
 
Where 𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾𝑖,𝑡 is a vector comprehensive of the entire volatility skew term 
structure and 𝑺𝑷𝑹𝑬𝑨𝑫𝑖,𝑡 is a vector comprehensive of the entire volatility spread 
term structure. 
Finally, we focus on the persistency over time of volatility skew’s (spread’s) 
informational content about future returns. In order to verify how many weeks in 
the future will be affected by volatility skews (spreads) we perform a regression 
analysis with lagged values of skews (spreads) up to 12 weeks. Equations (7) and 
(8) show the model. 
(7) 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑚 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑚𝑛
𝑗=2 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
(8)𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑚 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑚𝑛
𝑗=2 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
 
For values of j equal to 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12 and where 𝛾𝑗 represents the 
coefficient for j-th lagged values of skews (spreads). 
 
B. Portfolio Analysis 
Portfolio analysis builds an investment strategy based on implied volatility 
skew distribution and implied volatility spread distribution by investing each 
week in those stocks which fall in lower (upper) section of the distribution. We 
create four portfolios: two for the lower tail of volatility skew distribution and two 
for the upper tail. For the left hand side of the distribution we choose 1
st
 quintile 
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and 1
st
 decile while for the right hand side we choose 5
th
 quintile and 10
th
 decile. 
The same procedure has been carried on for volatility spread. 
In order to build a portfolio that invests in those stocks which fall in the 1
st
 
quintile (1
st
 decile) of volatility skew distribution, every week we sort banks in 
quintiles (deciles) according to their average weekly volatility skew. Average 
volatility skew is computed from Tuesday close to Tuesday close. Banks with 
lower volatility skew will fall in the lower quintile (decile) and banks with higher 
volatility skew will fall in the upper quintile (decile). Then we compute our 1
st
 
quintile (1
st
 decile) weekly return portfolio by averaging next week stocks’ returns 
for all stocks belonging to that quintile (decile). Stock’s weekly returns are 
calculated from Wednesday close to Wednesday close so that we have one entire 
trading day between the model set up and the performance analysis. The results is 
a portfolio which strategy is to buy each Wednesday the stocks that – in previous 
week – fall within the 1st quintile (1st decile) of volatility skew distribution of all 
72 banks. In order to pick the stocks with higher volatility skews values this 
process is replicated for 5
th
 quintile and 10
th
 decile. The same procedure has been 
led for volatility spread. 
For the analysis on volatility skew we generate a total of 40 portfolios by using 
two moneyness levels (90% and 95%), five different time-to-maturity options (1, 
2, 3, 6 and 12 months) and four different sections of distribution (1
st
 quintile, 1
st
 
decile, 5
th
 quintile and 10
th
 decile). 
For volatility spread we generate a total of 20 portfolios by using only ATM 
levels, five different time to maturity options (1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 months) and four 
different sections of distribution (1
st
 quintile, 1
st
 decile, 5
th
 quintile and 10
th
 
decile).  
Finally, we find interesting to observe average returns for each of the 60 
portfolios through four different time samples, in order to verify whether the 
results changes. The considered time samples are a full sample (from 2005 to 
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2014), one sample excluding the financial crisis (from Q1 2005 to Q2 2007 and 
from Q2 2009 to Q4 2014), one only considering the observations before the 
financial crisis (from Q1 2005 to Q2 2007) and another only the observations 
after the financial crisis (from Q2 2009 to Q4 2014). 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the first two moments and the most relevant percentiles for 
volatility skew – over the entire sample – for 90% and 95% moneyness levels and 
through all options maturities. Table 2 shows the same statistical factors for a 
restricted sample which excludes the financial crisis period. 
Skews exhibit an overall expensiveness of OTM put option compared to ATM 
call, for all levels of moneyness and for all options time to maturity. In specific 
lower levels of moneyness show larger skews and the shorter the maturity the 
larger the skew. Traders use lower moneyness option to hedge themselves against 
large drawdowns in stock’s price because of their relative cheapness and rely on 
shorter term options for liquidity reasons. For 90% moneyness, 1 month OTM put 
options are priced using an implied volatility 5.74 points higher than the one used 
in pricing ATM call options. For 95% moneyness this this overprice is equal to 
2.27. 
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TABLE 1 — VOLATILITY SKEWS (COMPLETE SAMPLE FROM Q1 2005 TO Q4 2014) 
 90% OTM put moneyness 
Maturity 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Mean 5.74 3.62 2.95 1.97 1.18 
Standard deviation 6.14 3.21 2.79 3.04 4.32 
5th percentile -0.06 -0.18 -0.37 -1.06 -3.16 
25th percentile 3.10 2.23 1.85 1.11 0.55 
50th percentile 5.34 3.64 3.02 2.14 1.55 
75th percentile 7.60 4.97 4.12 2.92 2.20 
  
 95% OTM put moneyness 
Maturity 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Mean 2.27 1.53 1.25 0.70 0.17 
Standard deviation 3.49 2.59 2.45 2.92 3.68 
5th percentile -0.95 -0.98 -1.20 -2.05 -4.05 
25th percentile 1.05 0.77 0.57 0.13 -0.24 
50th percentile 2.16 1.56 1.31 0.91 0.63 
75th percentile 3.21 2.25 1.92 1.38 1.07 
 
TABLE 2 — VOLATILITY SKEWS (EX-CRISIS SAMPLE FROM Q1 2005- Q2 2007 AND FROM Q2 2009- Q4 2014) 
 90% OTM put moneyness 
Maturity 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Mean 5.67 2.20 3.57 1.51 2.93 
Standard deviation 5.08 3.26 3.02 2.37 2.59 
5th percentile -0.09 -0.89 -0.17 -0.81 -0.33 
25th percentile 3.07 1.04 2.23 0.81 1.88 
50th percentile 5.30 2.12 3.61 1.56 3.02 
75th percentile 7.57 3.14 4.91 2.22 4.08 
  
 95% OTM put moneyness 
Maturity 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Mean 0.78 2.02 0.78 1.30 0.30 
Standard deviation 2.75 2.90 2.75 4.49 3.77 
5th percentile -1.66 -0.79 -1.66 -2.69 -3.62 
25th percentile 0.28 1.21 0.28 0.75 -0.02 
50th percentile 0.93 2.16 0.93 1.60 0.68 
75th percentile 1.36 2.89 1.36 2.21 1.09 
 
Table 3 shows the main statistical factors for volatility spreads. The spread, 
which is the difference between ATM call and ATM put option for the same 
maturity is minimal and non-homogenous among maturities. 
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TABLE 3 — VOLATILITY SPREADS  
 complete sample from Q1 2005 to Q4 2014 
Maturity 10 days 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Mean -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.37 0.69 
Standard 
deviation 
3.37 2.45 2.21 2.27 2.70 3.53 
5th percentile -2.53 -2.12 -1.93 -1.87 -1.71 -1.75 
25th 
percentile 
-0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
50th 
percentile 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75th 
percentile 
0.11 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.66 0.99 
   
 ex-Crisis sample from Q1 2005- Q2 2007 and from Q2 2009- Q4 2014 
Maturity 10 days 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Mean -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.24 0.55 
Standard 
deviation 
3.22 2.12 1.94 1.98 2.48 3.54 
5th percentile -2.39 -2.04 -1.88 -1.81 -1.76 -1.84 
25th 
percentile 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
50th 
percentile 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75th 
percentile 
0.05 0.07 0.12 0.22 0.47 0.71 
 
4.A. Regression Analysis Results 
Table 4 illustrates the results from Eq. (3). Univariate model shows that 
volatility skew is statistically significant for options with maturity up to 3 months, 
with a peak of significance at 2 months maturity. Skew coefficient is always 
negative and any increase in volatility skew delivers negative stocks’ returns in 
next week. A 1 basis point increase in current week average volatility skew 
(Tuesday close to Tuesday close) for 1 month OTM put option vs 1 month ATM 
call option produces a decrease in next week stock returns (Wednesday close to 
Wednesday close) by 1.37 bps. Options expiring in two months produce the 
greatest drawdown of -4.14 bps. 
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TABLE 4 — REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SKEWS 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (3). The model measures the effect of implied 
volatility skew on next week banks stock’ returns. Volatility skew is the difference between OTM put and ATM 
call and is computed for each time-to-maturity option. Panel A shows the univariate model comprehensive only 
of volatility skews, Panel B shows the full model with control variables. “Maturity” indicates the option‘s 
maturity, “Skew” is the associated volatility skew, “Crisis” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation 
falls within Financial Crisis (form Q3 2007 to Q1 2009) and 0 otherwise, “MKT, SMB, HML and UMB” 
represent the Fama-French four factors model control variables for market returns, size, value and momentum. 
For each variable we report coefficient and t-stat. Coefficients (except for the dummy variable) represent the 
change in next week stock’s prices when the considered variable increases by 100 bps. Bold figures represent 
coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
Panel A – Univariate Model 
Maturity 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Constant -0.01% 0.06% 0.02% -0.11% -0.12% 
 -0.30 1.23 0.45 -2.75 -3.01 
Skew -1.37% -4.14% -3.63% 0.80% 1.74% 
 -2.47 -3.82 -2.91 0.70 1.81 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
F-stat 6.12 14.55 8.48 0.49 3.17 
 
Panel B – Full Model 
Maturity 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Constant 0.19% 0.25% 0.22% 0.11% 0.11% 
 4.06 4.73 4.31 2.55 2.61 
Skew -1.27% -3.58% -3.35% 0.10% 0.96% 
 -2.29 -3.30 -2.69 0.09 1.00 
Crisis -1.35% -1.33% -1.34% -1.34% -1.45% 
 -15.94 -15.62 -15.63 -15.15 -14.26 
MKT 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.14% 0.14% 
 7.93 8.02 8.03 6.93 5.92 
SMB -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.03% 
 -1.25 -1.34 -1.31 -1.22 -0.76 
HML -0.21% -0.21% -0.21% -0.20% -0.23% 
 -5.17 -5.36 -5.34 -5.01 -4.95 
UMD 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.09% 
 3.01 2.89 2.91 2.56 3.61 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
F-stat 20.75 22.57 21.40 15.98 16.49 
      
 
Table 5 illustrates our results from model presented in Eq. (4). In univariate 
model volatility spread is statistically significant for options with maturity from 2 
to 12 months (with a peak of significance between 6 and 12 months) but when 
control variables are included, the model states that only 6 and 12 months’ time-
to-maturity options coefficients are statistically significant.  
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Spreads coefficient – when significant – is always positive, meaning that any 
increase in volatility spread delivers positive returns in next week. An increase of 
1 bp in this week average volatility spread (Tuesday close to Tuesday close) for 6 
months ATM options produces an increase in next week stock returns 
(Wednesday close to Wednesday close) by 5.78 bps in univariate model and by 
3.57 bps in full model. Options expiring in twelve months produce the greatest 
increase of 6 bps in univariate model and 4.5 bps in full model. 
 
TABLE 5 — REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SPREADS 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (4). The model measures the effect of implied 
volatility spread on next week banks stock’ returns. Volatility spread is the difference between ATM call and 
ATM put and is computed for each time-to-maturity option. Panel A shows the univariate model comprehensive 
only of volatility spreads, Panel B shows the full model with control variables. “Maturity” indicates the option 
maturity, “Spread” is the associated volatility spread, “Crisis” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation 
falls within Financial Crisis and o otherwise “MKT, SMB, HML and UMB” represent the Fama-French four 
factors model control variables for market returns, size, value and momentum. For each variable we report 
coefficient and t-stat. Coefficients (except for dummy variable) represent the change in next week stock’s prices 
when the considered variable increases by 100 bps. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at 
a 5 or below percent level. 
 Panel A – Univariate Model 
Maturity 10 days 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Constant -0.08% -0.09% -0.08% -0.08% -0.07% -0.05% 
 -2.56 -2.75 -2.67 -2.45 -2.08 -1.43 
Spread -0.32% 0.86% 4.22% 4.54% 5.78% 5.99% 
 -0.33 0.66 2.87 3.21 4.65 4.87 
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
F-stat 0.11 0.43 8.21 10.31 21.66 23.67 
  
 Panel B – Full Model 
Maturity 10 days 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
Constant 0.13% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.15% 
 3.52 3.48 3.41 3.50 3.37 3.56 
Spread 0.06% -0.16% 2.74% 2.65% 3.57% 4.54% 
 0.06 -0.13 1.86 1.87 2.85 3.66 
Crisis -1.34% -1.35% -1.33% -1.32% -1.31% -1.42% 
 -15.53 -15.89 -15.62 -15.63 -14.87 -14.00 
MKT 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.14% 0.14% 
 8.01 7.93 7.99 8.21 7.07 6.01 
SMB -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.03% 
 -1.33 -1.33 -1.42 -1.41 -1.30 -0.83 
HML -0.21% -0.21% -0.21% -0.21% -0.20% -0.23% 
 -5.16 -5.20 -5.28 -5.40 -5.06 -4.95 
UMD 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.09% 
 2.74 2.96 2.91 3.02 2.66 0.15% 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
F-stat 19.31 19.59 21.26 22.59 20.82 21.15 
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In order to verify which volatility skew (spread) leads in determining future 
equity returns and to cleanse the model from correlation between exogenous 
variables we perform a multivariate analysis, comprehensive of the entire term 
structure for volatility skews (spreads). Table 6 shows the model for volatility 
skews and volatility spreads. On volatility skew, exhibits from Table 6 confirm 
our findings in univariate analysis from Table 4 and 2 months volatility skew is 
the leading factor in conditioning future stock’s returns. A 1 bp increase in 2 
months volatility skew produces a negative return of 5 bps in next week. When 
volatility spread is considered results do confirm the positive correlation between 
spread and stocks’ return but identifies 1 and 2 months’ time-to-maturity options 
as the statistically significant ones instead of 6 and 12 months’ time-to-maturity 
options highlighted in Table 5. Overall, when an the entire term structure of 
volatility skew and spread is considered more liquid options appear to be the most 
influencing ones.  
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TABLE 6 — MULTIVARIATE MODEL FOR SKEWS AND SPREADS 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (5) and (6). The model measures how the 
entire term structure of skews and spreads volatility effects future equity returns of implied volatility. Volatility 
skews are obtained from Eq. (1) as the difference between OTM put and ATM call implied volatility. Volatility 
spreads are obtained from Eq. (2) as the difference between ATM call and ATM put option implied volatility. 
Volatility skews and spreads are computed for each time to maturity option covering the entire term structure. 
“Crisis” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation falls within Financial Crisis and o otherwise “MKT, 
SMB, HML and UMB” represent the Fama-French four factors model control variables. For each variable is 
reported the coefficient and its t-stat. Coefficients (except for dummy variable) represent the change in weekly 
stock’s price when the considered variable increases by 100 bps. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically 
significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
Maturity Skew Skew  Spread Spread  
Constant 0.12% 0.30% -0.05% 0.15% 
  1.69     4.10    -1.37     3.50    
10 days   -2.71% -3.60% 
   -0.70    -0.93    
1 month -0.65% -0.63% 11.46% 11.24% 
 -0.90    -0.88     2.02     1.99    
2 months -5.72% -4.99% 15.59% 15.60% 
 -2.39    -2.09     2.98     2.98    
3 months -0.33% 0.62% 6.66% 8.15% 
 -0.12     0.22     1.46     1.78    
6 months 1.48% 1.08% -4.27% -2.35% 
  0.88     0.64    -1.57    -0.86    
12 months 2.23% 1.33% -3.88% -3.24% 
  2.14     1.27    -2.31    -1.92    
Crisis  -1.43%  -1.42% 
  -14.00     -13.57    
MKT  0.14%  0.14% 
   5.94      5.80    
SMB  -0.03%  -0.03% 
  -0.76     -0.71    
HML  -0.24%  -0.23% 
  -5.03     -4.77    
UMD  0.09%  0.08% 
   3.58      3.36    
R-squared 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 
F-stat 4.55 29.92 5.68 26.69 
 
4.B. Portfolio Analysis Results 
Portfolios are built from weekly volatility skew distribution. Every week we 
rank all banks according to their volatility skew. Those banks with higher skews 
will have higher ranks while those with lower skews will have lower ranks. The 
result from this procedure is a time series of ranking values for each bank.  
We build four portfolios by investing each week in those banks which fall in 1
st
 
and 5
th
 quintiles and 1
st
 and 10
th
 deciles of the above illustrated ranking. By doing 
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so, our 1
st
 quintile and 1
st
 decile portfolios will perform a strategy which is long 
stocks belonging to the lower-end of implied volatility skews distribution (hence 
those stocks with OTM put option far more expensive than ATM call option) and 
our 5
th
 quintile and 10
th
 decile portfolios will perform a strategy which is long 
those stocks belonging to the upper-end of volatility skews distribution. The 
procedure is repeated for different moneyness levels and different time-to-
maturity options until we generate a total of 40 portfolios relying on volatility 
skew (since we selected two different moneyness levels, 0.90 and 0.95, five 
different time to maturity, 1 month and 2, 3 6 and 12 months, first and last 
quintiles and first and last deciles) and a total of 20 portfolios relying on volatility 
spread (since we select ATM level, five different time to maturity, 1 month and 2, 
3 6 and 12 months, first and last quintiles and first and last deciles). All portfolios 
have approximately 500 observations. 
Portfolio returns analysis supports our findings from regression analysis in 
section 4.A and the above mentioned literature. Quintiles portfolios are statistical 
significant and lower quintile (decile) portfolios underperform upper quintile 
(decile) portfolios for almost all time-to-maturities and all moneyness levels. 
Regarding volatility skew, a portfolio of stocks based on 1
st
 decile, 90% 
moneyness, 2 months maturity options underperform its upper decile equivalent 
by 19 basis points per week. This underperformance is even bigger if we exclude 
the financial crisis from the dataset (24 basis points) or if we consider only the 
sample after the financial crisis (25 basis point). 
Considering volatility spread, portfolio based on 1
st
 decile, 3 months to maturity 
options underperform its equivalent upper decile by 19 basis points per week, by 
29 basis points if we exclude the financial crisis from the sample and by 24 basis 
points if we consider only the sample after the financial crisis. 
When we exclude financial crisis from our sample, all portfolio returns are 
shifted upward and almost all perform a positive return. Still, underperformance 
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of left hand side skew distribution portfolios (1
st
 quintile and 1
st
 decile) with 
respect to right hand side distribution (5
th
 quintile and 10
th
 quintile) stands strong. 
Similar results are obtained for a pre-crisis sample (from Q1 2005 to Q2 2007) 
and for after crisis sample (from Q2 2009 to Q4 2014). 
In Table 7 we consider two different volatility skews, one computed using 90% 
OTM put option and another computed using 95% put option. An overview on 
average weekly returns shows that 1
st
 quintiles and 1
st
 deciles portfolios always 
deliver returns significantly lower than 5
th
 quintiles and 10
th
 deciles portofolios. 
For 90% moneyness level of volatility skew, investing in a portfolio based on 1
st
 
decile implied volatility skews for an option expiring in 2 months delivers a 
negative return of -17 bps per week. For 95% moneyness level, investing in a 
portfolio based on 1
st
 decile implied volatility skews for an option expiring in 1 
month delivers a negative return of -21 bps per week. 
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TABLE 7 — PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SKEWS 
This table shows the results from portfolio analysis on volatility skews for different time to maturity options. 
Portfolio of banks are built according to weekly volatility skew distribution. Each week a volatility skew 
distribution is computed and banks are ranked according to this distribution, higher values of skew have higher 
ranks while lower values of skew have lower ranks. For 90% and 95% moneyness levels four portfolios are 
computed using 1
st
 and 5
th
 quintiles and 1
st
 and 10
th
 deciles of the distribution. Bold figures represent 
coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
Skew for 90% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month -0.17% -0.01% 15.45 -0.11% 0.05% 16.07 
 -2.04 -0.20  -1.35 0.74  
2months -0.17% 0.02% 19.16 -0.17% 0.02% 18.83 
 -2.12 0.28  -1.98 0.28  
3 months -0.14% 0.02% 15.49 -0.12% 0.04% 16.08 
 -1.74 0.26  -1.48 0.58  
6 months -0.16% -0.07% 9.39 -0.14% -0.10% 4.24 
 -2.10 -0.95  -1.83 -1.19  
12 months -0.11% -0.15% -3.68 -0.12% -0.08% 3.76 
 -1.26 -1.74  -1.19 -0.79  
       
 
Skew for 95% OTM put option 
 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month -0.21% -0.01% 20.07 -0.24% 0.02% 26.08 
 -2.53 -0.09  -1.93 0.18  
2months -0.12% -0.02% 10.23 -0.16% -0.07% 8.85 
 -1.46 -0.28  -1.32 -0.68  
3 months -0.09% -0.04% 4.85 -0.14% -0.16% -1.95 
 -1.11 -0.53  -1.27 -1.54  
6 months -0.14% -0.12% 1.93 -0.16% -0.21% -4.99 
 -1.78 -1.56  -1.57 -1.89  
12 months -0.07% -0.16% -8.24 -0.09% -0.24% -14.87 
 -0.84 -1.82  -0.75 -1.73  
 
Table 8 shows results for portfolio analysis on implied volatilities spreads. 
Portfolios are built using the same rationale in Table 7 although the rank is based 
on implied volatility spread, hence banks with higher spread receive a higher rank 
and banks with lower spread a lower rank. As for Table 7 deciles portfolio fail to 
deliver wide statistical significant return since only 1
st
 deciles portfolio returns 
show stronger statistical significance. General results show that stocks with 
relative more expensive ATM put than ATM call will suffer from drawdown in 
future prices but there is no evidence supporting any informational content in 
spreads for upside movements. More in specific, 1
st
 quintile portfolio based on 2, 
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3, 6 and 12 months’ time to maturity options deliver significant negative weekly 
return. 1
st
 decile portfolio based on volatility spread from 6 months’ time to 
maturity option will deliver a negative weekly return of -32 bps, 18 bps lower 
than its 10
th
 decile equivalent. 
 
TABLE 8 — PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SPREADS 
This table shows the results from portfolio analysis on volatility spreads for different time to maturity options. 
Portfolio of banks are built according to weekly volatility spread distribution. Each week a volatility spread 
distribution is computed and banks are ranked according to this distribution, higher values of spread have higher 
ranks while lower spread have lower ranks. Four portfolios are computed using 1
st
 and 5
th
 quintiles and 1
st
 and 
10
th
 deciles of the distribution. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent 
level. 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
10 days -0.04% -0.08% -4.31 -0.08% -0.12% -4.24 
 -0.81 -1.04  -1.25 -1.06  
1 month -0.15% -0.05% 9.90 -0.06% -0.13% -6.40 
 -2.90 -0.67  -0.99 -1.18  
2months -0.22% -0.11% 11.13 -0.12% -0.05% 7.43 
 -4.00 -1.34  -1.89 -0.45  
3 months -0.22% 0.00% 21.82 -0.20% -0.01% 19.36 
 -3.92 -0.03  -3.01 -0.09  
6 months -0.24% -0.07% 17.47 -0.32% -0.14% 18.25 
 -4.58 -0.88  -4.83 -1.19  
12 months -0.27% -0.11% 16.16 -0.22% -0.11% 11.17 
 -4.89 -1.14  -3.17 -0.78  
 
Generally speaking we can conclude that volatility skew is strongly negative 
correlated with future equity returns and volatility spread is strongly positive 
correlated with future equity returns. But not all option contracts affect equity 
returns the same, the most active contracts, 2 and 3 months’ time to maturity 
options, appear to be also the relevant ones. 
 
C. Investment Horizon 
In order to verify the lasting effect of implied volatility skews and spreads on 
future week stock returns we perform a regression analysis with lagged values of 
skew (spread) up to 12 weeks as exogenous variables. 
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General results show that, when lagged values of skew (spread) are considered, 
variables coefficient are affected by market microstructure noise. Although 
coefficients’ sign mostly validate our findings from Eq. (3) and (4) adding lags 
brings a sort of correction effect in weekly returns. Table 9 shows the results from 
the model presented in Eq. (5) and (6). 
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TABLE 9 — STRETCHING THE INVESTMENT HORIZON FOR SKEW AND SPREAD 
This table shows results from model presented in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8). The model performs a regression analysis on future equity returns using lagged values of volatility skew 
(spread) up to 12 weeks, for the entire term structure. The focus of this model is to estimate the persistency of skew (spread) in shaping future returns over time. Options expiring 
in one month present a series of lagged exogenous variables truncated to 4 weeks and options expiring in two months a series truncated to 8 weeks. Each regression present 
coefficient and t-stat for the considered lagged values of skew (spread). Coefficients represent the change in weekly stock’s price when the considered variable increases by 100 
bps. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
Skew Spread 
 
1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
1 week -0.80% -3.77% -5.60% -0.60% 0.71% 5.05% 9.49% 8.63% 5.32% 5.22% 
 
-1.29 -2.45 -3.50 -0.30 0.43 2.74 4.21 3.67 2.43 1.64 
2 weeks -0.27% 2.88% 2.80% 0.77% 4.12% -3.54% -3.75% -2.40% 0.97% 8.06% 
 
-0.40 1.74 1.67 0.36 2.25 -1.84 -1.54 -0.92 0.40 2.11 
3 weeks -1.00% -3.69% -3.65% 2.06% -0.75% -4.79% -5.43% -3.78% 0.53% -11.17% 
 
-1.52 -2.22 -2.16 0.94 -0.41 -2.46 -2.19 -1.43 0.21 -2.91 
4 weeks -0.62% 2.43% 2.61% 6.45% 3.45% 7.87% 9.01% 9.98% 9.81% 15.10% 
 
-1.00 1.49 1.55 2.95 1.93 4.05 3.65 3.78 3.97 3.95 
5 weeks - -1.58% -2.01% -2.74% -0.63%  2.39% 2.25% 4.03% 5.83% 
 
 -0.96 -1.19 -1.25 -0.35  0.99 0.87 1.65 1.55 
6 weeks - 2.87% 1.55% 0.90% -0.84%  -1.37% -0.54% 0.97% -1.15% 
 
 1.73 0.96 0.42 -0.51  -0.59 -0.22 0.41 -0.33 
8 weeks - -2.86% 0.18% -2.34% -2.88%  1.06% 3.90% 3.03% 5.56% 
 
 -1.73 0.12 -1.13 -1.95  0.49 1.73 1.26 1.82 
10 weeks - - -2.40% -2.59% 0.52%   3.97% 4.27% 3.08% 
   0.10 -1.21 0.35   1.78 1.66 1.02 
12 weeks - - 0.83% 0.23% 1.48%   -6.79% -2.82% -4.80% 
   0.60 0.13 1.16   -3.43 -1.27 -1.92 
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
F-stat 3.15 5.91 4.22 1.65 2.72 6.15 6.37 6.19 6.97 10.77 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate how implied volatility skews and implied volatility 
spreads affect banks’ stock performance. In order to do that, we perform a 
regression and a portfolio analysis. In the regression analysis we analyze next 
week stocks return over previous week volatility skew (spread). Regression is 
performed both in a univariate and multivariate framework. Multivariate analysis 
includes the entire term structure of volatility skews (spreads) and is useful to 
cleanse the model from any correlation among exogenous variables. 
Our findings show a negative correlation between skew and future returns, 
suggesting that volatility skew capture traders’ expectation about downfalls in 
future stock returns. Negative correlation is statistically significant only for short 
term time-to-maturity options and when we perform a multivariate analysis, 2 
months to maturity options appear to be the leading contract in influencing future 
returns. 
Volatility spread, on the other hand, appears to be positive correlated with next 
week stock returns, suggesting that an overprice in ATM call with respect to 
ATM put option delivers statistically significant positive returns in next week. 
When we perform univariate model, longer maturity options show statistically 
significant results, however when we implement a multivariate model, 2 months 
to maturity options is the only one with statistically significant positive 
coefficient.  
In portfolio analysis we perform investment strategies based on lower and upper 
end of volatility skews distribution and volatility spreads distribution. For the 
lower end of the distribution we create two portfolios: one investing in the 1
st
 
quintile and another investing in the 1
st
 decile. For the upper end of the 
distribution we create two portfolios: one investing in the 5
th
 quintile and another 
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investing in the 10
th
 decile. We ran the procedure for the entire volatility term 
structure, resulting in 40 portfolios generated for volatility skew and 20 for 
volatility spread. Results show that investing in stocks which permanently falls 
within the 1
st
 decile of volatility skew distribution underperforms those stocks 
which belong to the 10
th
 decile up to 26 basis points when we consider the entire 
sample, and by 24 bps if we exclude the financial crisis from the considered time 
frame. 
Volatility spread shows similar results, if we invest in stocks which fall within 
the 1
st
 decile of volatility spread distribution we underperform those stocks which 
belong to the 10
th
 decile up to 19 bps when we consider the entire sample, and 29 
bps if we exclude the financial crisis. 
Summing up we can conclude that skew is negative correlated with future 
equity returns and spread is positive correlated with future equity returns. Also, 
option contracts expiring in two months – which together with 3 months maturity 
are the most liquid contracts – seem to deliver most of the informational content 
about future returns. This paper expanded the field of study for option implied 
volatility informational content by analyzing the financial industry and splitting 
option informational content among different time to maturities and moneyness 
levels. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1 — PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SKEW AND SPREAD (EX-CRISIS) 
This table shows the results from portfolio analysis on volatility skews and spread for different time to maturity 
options. Portfolio of banks are built according to weekly volatility skew (spread) distribution. Each week a 
volatility skew (spread) distribution is computed and banks are ranked according to this distribution, higher 
values of skew (spread) have higher ranks while lower values of skew (spread) have lower ranks. Four 
portfolios are computed using 1
st
 and 5
th
 quintiles and 1
st
 and 10
th
 deciles of the distribution. The considered 
time frame is from Q1 2005 to Q2 2007 and from Q2 2009 to Q4 2014, in order to exclude the financial crisis 
period from the sample. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
Skew for 90% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month 0.10% 0.24% 14.28 0.087% 0.319% 23.26 
 -2.04 -0.20  0.57 2.56  
2months 0.07% 0.19% 12.40 -0.009% 0.234% 24.30 
 -2.12 0.28  -0.06 1.74  
3 months 0.10% 0.18% 7.78 0.120% 0.261% 14.14 
 -1.74 0.26  0.75 1.73  
6 months 0.07% 0.11% 4.11 0.060% 0.097% 3.71 
 -2.10 -0.95  0.37 0.58  
12 months 0.15% 0.03% -11.85 0.092% 0.102% 1.04 
 -1.26 -1.74  0.47 0.63  
       
Skew for 95% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month 0.09% 0.22% 12.79 0.06% 0.27% 21.46 
 -2.53 -0.09  -1.93 0.18  
2months 0.15% 0.15% 0.68 0.07% 0.16% 9.41 
 -1.46 -0.28  -1.32 -0.68  
3 months 0.18% 0.15% -3.22 0.17% 0.06% -10.36 
 -1.11 -0.53  -1.27 -1.54  
6 months 0.10% 0.07% -3.24 0.06% 0.02% -3.67 
 -1.78 -1.56  -1.57 -1.89  
12 months 0.14% 0.03% -11.52 0.14% -0.02% -16.36 
 -0.84 -1.82  -0.75 -1.73  
       
Spread 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles Quintiles Deciles Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  1
st
  5
th
  1
st
  5
th
  
10 days 0.03% 0.23% 20.65 0.00% 0.21% 21.27 
 -0.81 -1.04  -1.25 -1.06  
1 month 0.05% 0.22% 16.98 0.02% 0.14% 11.96 
 -2.90 -0.67  -0.99 -1.18  
2 months 0.01% 0.20% 18.60 -0.01% 0.20% 20.97 
 -4.00 -1.34  -1.89 -0.45  
3 months 0.04% 0.26% 22.10 -0.06% 0.23% 29.53 
 -3.92 -0.03  -3.01 -0.09  
6 months 0.03% 0.19% 15.88 -0.04% 0.12% 16.16 
 -4.58 -0.88  -4.83 -1.19  
12 months 0.03% 0.16% 12.76 0.01% 0.15% 14.36 
 -4.89 -1.14  -3.17 -0.78  
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TABLE A.2 — PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SKEW AND SPREAD (PRE CRISIS) 
This table shows the results from portfolio analysis on volatility skews and spread for different time to maturity 
options. Portfolio of banks are built according to weekly volatility skew (spread) distribution. Each week a 
volatility skew (spread) distribution is computed and banks are ranked according to this distribution, higher 
values of skew (spread) have higher ranks while lower values of skew (spread) have lower ranks. Four 
portfolios are computed using 1
st
 and 5
th
 quintiles and 1
st
 and 10
th
 deciles of the distribution. The considered 
time frame is from Q1 2005 to Q2 2007. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or 
below percent level. 
Skew for 90% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month 0.10% 0.24% 14.28 0.087% 0.319% 23.26 
 -2.04 -0.20  0.57 2.56  
2months 0.07% 0.19% 12.40 -0.009% 0.234% 24.30 
 -2.12 0.28  -0.06 1.74  
3 months 0.10% 0.18% 7.78 0.120% 0.261% 14.14 
 -1.74 0.26  0.75 1.73  
6 months 0.07% 0.11% 4.11 0.060% 0.097% 3.71 
 -2.10 -0.95  0.37 0.58  
12 months 0.15% 0.03% -11.85 0.092% 0.102% 1.04 
 -1.26 -1.74  0.47 0.63  
       
Skew for 95% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month 0.09% 0.22% 12.79 0.06% 0.27% 21.46 
 -2.53 -0.09  -1.93 0.18  
2months 0.15% 0.15% 0.68 0.07% 0.16% 9.41 
 -1.46 -0.28  -1.32 -0.68  
3 months 0.18% 0.15% -3.22 0.17% 0.06% -10.36 
 -1.11 -0.53  -1.27 -1.54  
6 months 0.10% 0.07% -3.24 0.06% 0.02% -3.67 
 -1.78 -1.56  -1.57 -1.89  
12 months 0.14% 0.03% -11.52 0.14% -0.02% -16.36 
 -0.84 -1.82  -0.75 -1.73  
       
Spread 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles Quintiles Deciles Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  1
st
  5
th
  1
st
  5
th
  
10 days -0.81 -1.04  -1.25 -1.06  
 0.05% 0.22% 16.98 0.02% 0.14% 11.96 
1 month -2.90 -0.67  -0.99 -1.18  
 0.01% 0.20% 18.60 -0.01% 0.20% 20.97 
2 months -4.00 -1.34  -1.89 -0.45  
 0.04% 0.26% 22.10 -0.06% 0.23% 29.53 
3 months -3.92 -0.03  -3.01 -0.09  
 0.03% 0.19% 15.88 -0.04% 0.12% 16.16 
6 months -4.58 -0.88  -4.83 -1.19  
 0.03% 0.16% 12.76 0.01% 0.15% 14.36 
12 months -4.89 -1.14  -3.17 -0.78  
 -0.81 -1.04  -1.25 -1.06  
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TABLE A.3 — PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY SKEW AND SPREAD (POST CRISIS) 
This table shows the results from portfolio analysis on volatility skews and spread for different time to maturity 
options. Portfolio of banks are built according to weekly volatility skew (spread) distribution. Each week a 
volatility skew (spread) distribution is computed and banks are ranked according to this distribution, higher 
values of skew (spread) have higher ranks while lower values of skew (spread) have lower ranks. Four 
portfolios are computed using 1
st
 and 5
th
 quintiles and 1
st
 and 10
th
 deciles of the distribution. The considered 
time frame is from Q2 2009 to Q4 2014. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or 
below percent level. 
Skew for 90% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month 0.06% 0.22% 15.83 0.075% 0.335% 25.99 
 -2.04 -0.20  0.33 1.85  
2months 0.02% 0.19% 16.87 -0.072% 0.180% 25.21 
 -2.12 0.28  -0.31 0.92  
3 months 0.04% 0.17% 12.74 0.085% 0.244% 15.87 
 -1.74 0.26  0.36 1.10  
6 months 0.01% 0.08% 7.28 -0.021% 0.039% 6.01 
 -2.10 -0.95  -0.09 0.16  
12 months 0.11% -0.01% -11.37 0.097% 0.111% 1.42 
 -1.26 -1.74  0.33 0.46  
       
Skew for 95% OTM put option 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  5
th
 – 1st (bps) 1st  10th  10th – 1st (bps) 
1 month 0.05% 0.20% 15.18 0.02% 0.26% 24.11 
 -2.53 -0.09  -1.93 0.18  
2months 0.12% 0.13% 0.62 0.04% 0.12% 8.11 
 -1.46 -0.28  -1.32 -0.68  
3 months 0.16% 0.13% -3.61 0.14% 0.01% -12.38 
 -1.11 -0.53  -1.27 -1.54  
6 months 0.06% 0.04% -1.83 -0.02% -0.02% -0.16 
 -1.78 -1.56  -1.57 -1.89  
12 months 0.11% 0.01% -10.72 0.11% -0.03% -13.77 
 -0.84 -1.82  -0.75 -1.73  
       
Spread 
Option time to 
maturity 
Quintiles Deciles Quintiles Deciles Quintiles Deciles 
1
st
  5
th
  1
st
  5
th
  1
st
  5
th
  
10 days -0.01% 0.19% 19.72 -0.01% 0.17% 18.23 
 -0.81 -1.04  -1.25 -1.06  
1 month 0.02% 0.14% 12.68 0.00% 0.02% 1.19 
 -2.90 -0.67  -0.99 -1.18  
2 months -0.03% 0.14% 16.70 -0.02% 0.08% 10.91 
 -4.00 -1.34  -1.89 -0.45  
3 months -0.04% 0.21% 25.86 -0.12% 0.12% 24.76 
 -3.92 -0.03  -3.01 -0.09  
6 months -0.05% 0.13% 17.89 -0.10% 0.04% 14.03 
 -4.58 -0.88  -4.83 -1.19  
12 months 0.00% 0.10% 10.01 -0.04% 0.08% 12.56 
 -4.89 -1.14  -3.17 -0.78  
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Chapter II – Volatility risk measures and banks’ leverage 
By GIULIO ANSELMI 
In this paper we investigate how volatility risk may influence bank’s 
capital structure when we allow for the possibility that bank’s 
capital provisions depends from variables other than mandatory 
capital regulation. By identifying four volatility risk measure and 
regressing them over bank’s market leverage we studied how banks 
adjust their balance sheet when they discount a risk premia from 
traders. The four volatility risk measures are volatility skew, 
volatility spread, variance risk premia and realized volatility. 
Among these four volatility skew, which is the difference between 
OTM put and ATM call implied volatility and absorb traders 
perceived tail risk delivers the strongest result if affecting bank’s 
leverage. In particular as volatility skew increases – hence OTM put 
became more expensive than ATM call – banks deleverage their 
assets structure. One plausible explanation is connected to the 
higher costs which should face the bank when raises new equity 
during a period of distress. As bank faces the possibility to incur in 
expensive equity issuing deleverage its balance sheet and create a 
buffer. 
* Giulio Anselmi, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo Gemelli, 1, Milano, Italy, giulio.anselmi@unicatt.it  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we focus on the informational content of exchange-traded options 
to detect banks’ capital structure adjustments and whether implied volatility can 
predict future changes in banks’ capital structure. 
Banks’ minimum capital requirements work as a buffer in absorbing losses and 
in bounding risk taking and they also partially amend to the moral hazard 
resulting from deposit insurance. Although the need for capital requirements is 
not in discussion, their calibration is still a hot topic and fine tuning them is 
important to identify the right amount of cash to put aside for depositors’ and 
other stakeholders’ protection from financial crisis without compromising banks’ 
efficiency.  
Efficient asset allocation is vital for banking sector which invests depositors’ 
money in borrowers’ business and where any loan loss from banking activity may 
compromise bank’s profitability and require an injection of additional capital, 
either in bail out or bail in form. 
Recent financial crisis shed light on the misleadingness of existing capital 
provisions and how they are affected from mark-to-market of assets held for sales 
–  such as sovereign bonds or other securities –  or how they are undermined from 
losses on lending activity. This weakness opened some space for discussions on 
the efficiency of current capital ratios and buffers and which are the determinants 
of financial leverage. Is it solely dependent on capital regulation or relies also on 
other factors? In this framework previous literature, on non-financial corporates’ 
capital structure and on the effectiveness of market signals in enhancing 
regulatory tools, may come in help in understanding the determinants for banks’ 
financial leverage and how to fix it. 
In order to investigate capital structure decision and which factors are crucial in 
determining it, we should first emancipate from the view that banks’ capital – due 
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to the high costs of holding it – is solely defined by capital requirements 
regulation and only this constraint justifies its departure from Modigliani and 
Miller [1958] proposition of irrelevance. Once we assume that capital structure is 
affected by some bank’s specific features we are free to investigate balance sheet 
items as much as market variables in order to discover which factors are more 
critical and if the risk priced by investors plays a role in determining banks’ 
financial leverage. 
If traders’ quote for risk premia on banks affects the financial leverage market 
discipline, which is defined as a series of corrective actions taken by authorities 
based on the screening of market prices, could represent an additional tool in 
reinforcing capital requirements efficiency. 
When market discipline is the topic, previous studies offer a broad range of 
securities to focus on. While subordinated debt and credit default swaps have 
been already discussed by previous literature, we focus our attention on implied 
volatility derived from options and how this risk measure affects the dynamics of 
banks’ capital structure. 
Option-based risk measures deliver several advantages with respect to 
accounting measures. First of all, they are forward looking measure based on 
traders’ expectations about equity future prices rather than accounting based 
measure which are backward looking and lagged indicators. Second, option prices 
are computed at much higher frequencies than traditional measures hence they 
adapt to changing market conditions quickly and can help delivering 
informational content about banks’ capital structure. Third, by selecting different 
type of options and moneyness levels one can detect different kinds of risks. 
Also, options market is a suitable environment for informed traders thanks to 
the high use of leverage, the asymmetric payoff and no constraint in short selling. 
Options give the opportunity but not the obligation to buy or sell a specific asset 
at a specific price within – or at – a specific point in time. Traders operate in 
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option market by quoting their implied volatilities for different maturities and 
moneyness according to their view on future stock’s returns. The result of this 
trading produces volatility skews, smirks and spreads which get away from Black 
and Scholes [1973] environment of constant volatility across all maturity and all 
moneyness. 
By studying the effect of implied volatility measure on banks’ leverage we want 
to investigate whether traders preemptively discount future changes in financial 
leverage and hence whether they account for any capital distress in banks. If a 
bank is expected to face assets’ impairments will most probably put aside more 
capital as a buffer in order to face those losses without going through the costs 
from raising equity at short notice. By using a measure of equity-related risk we 
should be able to proxy asset risk which is critical for banks. Using equity-based 
data as proxy for asset-risk, among several studies and literatures, has been 
stressed out – for financial institutions – by Huang et al. [2009]. 
Our study is conducted via a regression analysis on a panel dataset of banks’ 
balance sheets and their corresponding implied volatilities and is organized as 
follows: First, we investigates whether volatility risk measure affect banks market 
leverage then we add to the analysis control variables in order to evidence the 
second order importance of capital regulation in determining capital structure as 
already exposed by Gropp and Heider [2009]. In order to cope with 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation issues standard errors are clustered at 
bank level as suggested by Peterson [2009]. As a robusteness check we run the 
analysis also on leverage and option-implied volatility risk measure changes. 
As banks’ leverage measure we identify a market-based measure denoted as 
1 −
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
. Table 1 describes the main characteristics of banks’ leverage. 
As a risk measures we select three different option-based variables and one 
stock-based variable. Volatility skew, which can be shortly defined as the 
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difference in implied volatility between out-of-the-money (OTM) put and at-the-
money (ATM) call and should capture expectations about a left tail event in stock 
prices. Volatility spread, which is the difference between ATM call implied 
volatility and ATM put implied volatility and should capture expectations about 
future stock performance. Variance Risk Premia (VRP hereafter) as the difference 
between ATM call implied volatility and realized volatility from historical returns 
which captures changes in perceived riskiness of the bank. As stock-based risk 
measure we select realized volatility. 
In our study we discovered that volatility skew negatively affects market 
leverage and hence any increase in trader’s perceived downturn risk is translated 
into a reduction of market leverage in the next quarter. As pointed out by Gropp 
and Heider [2009] for non-financial firms, it seems that a perception of a riskier 
business leads to higher costs for raising more equity in case of needs for bank’s 
recapitalization and henceforth banks which are interested in avoiding these costs 
conduct a deleverage in their capital structure. 
On the other hand, volatility spread produces an increase in asset leverage as a 
better outlook for firm’s business is translated into an increase of upward potential 
in stock markets. The same happens for VRP which delivers an increase in bank’s 
leverage as the premium over past volatility levels increases. This relationship is 
somehow in opposition with what we found for volatility skew and what Borochin 
and Yang [2014] discovered for non-financial firms. Finally, realized volatility 
negatively affects bank’s leverage. 
This paper is organized as follow, Section 1 is the introduction, Section 2 
presents previous literature related to the topic, Section 3 describes the data and 
the methodology used in the analysis, Section 4 illustrates the results and 
robustness check analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Previous Literature 
Berger et al. [1995] investigate the role of capital for financial institutions and 
how a market-generated capital requirement differs from regulatory requirements 
and Santos [2001] reviews the literature on the design of the financial system and 
on bank capital regulation presenting as well a list of the market failures that 
justify banking regulation. Barth et al. [2005], Berger et al. [2008] and Brewer et 
al. [2008] observe that bank capital’s levels are higher than what regulation 
dictates opening up for discussion about what determines this buffers. On non-
binding capital requirements and banks’ capital structure flexibility see Flannery 
[1994], Myers and Rajan [1998], Diamond and Rajan [2000] and Allen et al. 
[2009]. On the other hand Flannery and Nikolova [2004] and Gropp [2004] offer 
a survey on non-binding capital requirements in a market discipline framework. 
Also, Gropp and Heider [2009] see capital regulation only as a second order 
factor in determining capital structure for large banks and capital buffers held to 
to avoid falls below minimum capital requirements also fail to explain the high 
levels of banks’ discretionary capital detained. Instead, with exception for those 
banks whose capital ratio is close to regulatory minimum, market leverage is 
driven by market-to-book-ratio, bank’s size, dividends and risk – where risk is 
defined as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock price returns adjusted 
by the market capitalization to total assets ratio. They investigate also whether 
macro variables affect book and market leverage and find out that inflation and 
stock markets’ risk decrease market leverage while spread’s term structure 
increases it. Brunnermeier et al. [2008] distinguish between regulatory and market 
based capital. 
Chernyk and Cole [2014] test the predictive power of several alternative 
measures of bank capital adequacy in identifying US bank failures during the 
recent crisis period. They found out that non-performing asset coverage ratio 
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(NPACR) significantly outperforms Basel-based ratios throughout the crisis 
period by accounting for both banking risks and asset quality, aligning capital and 
credit risk, eliminating banking management incentives to mask capital deficiency 
and allowing to account for various time period and cross-country provisioning 
rules. 
Sorokina and Thornton [2014] show that loan market competition and loan 
portfolio diversification reduce banks’ leverage and excess leverage and short-
term borrowing of banks increase in low market liquidity conditions. They also 
state that banks’ capital structure significantly affects capital structure of non-
financial firms since an increase in banks’ holding of capital reduces firms’ 
leverage. 
Valencia [2011] explains how monetary policy rates affect bank risk-taking and 
its leverage by showing that under limited liability a decrease in interest rate 
produces an increase in banks profitability which could lead to take excessive risk 
and leverage. 
On the relationship between market returns and capital ratios Demirguc-Kunt et 
al. [2010] use a multi-country panel of banks to study whether better capitalized 
banks experienced higher stock return during financial crisis. They find out that 
before the crisis differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns 
while during the financial crisis a stronger capital position was associated with 
better stock market performance and relationship between stock returns and 
capital is stronger when capital is measured by Tier I capital to total asset leverage 
ratio. 
Calem and Rob [1998] identify a U-shape relationship between bank capital and 
risk. As their capital increases banks first take less risk, then more risk. A deposit 
insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take 
more risk and an increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends 
– 43 –  
 
to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the 
new standard. 
Berger and Bouwman [2013] examine how capital affects a bank’s performance 
and state that capital helps small banks to increase their profitability of survival 
and market share at all times while for large banks enhances performance 
primarily during banking crisis. 
Previous literature on capital structure determinants mostly focus on non-
financial firms and Frank and Goyal [2009] in examining which factors are 
relevant in capital structure decisions for American firms notice that the most 
reliable factors for explaining an increase in market leverage are median industry 
leverage, tangibility of assets, log of assets and expected inflation and for 
explaining a decrease in capital ratios are market-to-book ratio and firm’s profits. 
Book leverage indicates similar results. While Welch [2004] and Lemmon et al. 
[2008] find out that risk significantly reduces leverage. Negative correlation 
between risk and leverage agrees with traditional corporate finance literature as 
well as with regulatory view, where, riskier banks are required to hold more 
equity in order to prevent any solvency or liquidity issues. 
Regarding implied volatility risk measure and its application to firms, Bates 
[1991] states that the set of index call and put option prices across different 
moneyness levels gives a direct indication of market participants’ aggregate 
subjective distribution of future price realizations. Therefore, OTM puts become 
more expensive compared to ATM calls and volatility skew increases before big 
negative jumps in price levels. In his paper shows that out-of-the money puts 
became unusually expensive during the year preceding the 1987 crash and by 
setting a model for pricing American option on jump-diffusion processes with 
systematic jump risk is shown that jump-diffusion parameters implicit in option 
prices indicate a crash was expected and that implicit distributions were 
negatively skewed in the year preceding 1987. 
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Pan [2002] documents that informational content of volatility smirk for the S&P 
500 index option with 30 days to expiration is 10% on a median volatility day, in 
his paper he incorporates both jump risk premium and volatility risk premium and 
shows that investors’ aversion toward negative jumps is the driving force for 
volatility skew. For OTM put options the jump risk premium component 
characterizes 80% of total risk premium, while the jump premium for OTM calls 
is just 30% of total risk premium. 
Doran et al. [2006] use a probit model for all options on S&P 100 from 1996 to 
2002 to demonstrate that the shape of the skew can reveal with significant 
probability when the market will “crash” or “spike”. Their findings suggest that 
there is predictive information content in volatility skew and put-only volatility 
skew has strong predictive power in forecasting short-term market declines. 
Xing et al. [2010] show that implied volatility smirk (defined has the difference 
between the implied volatilities of OTM put options and the implied volatilities of 
ATM call options is persistent and has significant predictive power for future 
equity returns. In their study stocks exhibiting the steepest smirks tend to 
underperform stocks with least pronounced volatility smirks by 10.9% per year on 
a risk-adjusted basis and using the Fama and French [1996] three-factor model. 
They also find that predictability of the volatility skew on future stock returns 
lasts for at least six months and stocks with steepest volatility smirks are those 
experiencing the worst earning shocks in the following quarter. 
Cremers and Weinbaum [2010] find that deviations from put-call parity contain 
information about future stock prices. By comparing pairs of call and put they 
discover that stocks with relative expensive calls outperform stocks with relative 
expensive puts by at least 45 basis points per week. 
Liu et al. [2014] further inspect option-implied volatilities informational content 
by investigate the industry effect of portfolio of stocks constructed according to 
implied volatility measure and comparing those portfolios with industry-neutral 
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portfolios of stocks. They find that quintile portfolios constructed using volatility 
skew and volatility spread are subject to substantial industry effect and industry-
neutral portfolio over perform. 
Borochin and Yang [2014] analyze the relationship between option implied 
volatility measure and capital structure  for non-financial firms. They say that 
option implied volatility is a good proxy for cash flow risk and as the latter grows 
also the likelihood of a firm entering in default increases, producing a rise in cost 
of debt and ultimate a decrease in firm’s leverage. They also use forward looking 
risk estimates impounded into option prices to create market-based indices which 
explain the ability to change firm’s capital structure more than traditional 
accounting-based measures. Finally they construct indices using implied volatility 
spread, implied volatility skew and volatility risk premium and perform a long-
short trading strategy based on these indices which generates abnormal returns 
from 2.3% to 4.9% over one year. 
Bollerslev, Tauchen and Zhou [2009] provide empirical evidence that stock 
market returns are predictable using the difference between implied volatilities 
and realized volatilities or variance risk premia. Moreover, stock returns are 
positively correlated with variance risk premium and the degree of predictability 
is as its largest at quarterly horizons but the premium still explains observed 
return variation at monthly and annual horizons. Volatility risk premium captures 
risk premium for option sellers to bear losses on the underlying stock. 
Goyal and Saretto [2009] study cross-section stock option returns by sorting 
stocks on the difference between historical realized volatility and at-the-money 
implied volatility and find that auto-financing trading strategy that is long (short) 
in the portfolio with a large positive (negative) difference between historical 
volatility and implied volatility produces economically and statistically significant 
monthly returns. They observe that deviation between historical volatility and 
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implied volatility are transitory and indicative of option mispricing, hence future 
volatility will converge to its long-run historical volatility. 
Zhou [2009] presents evidence of variance risk premia forecasting ability for 
financial market risk premia across equity, bond, currency and credit asset classes 
and this forecasting ability is maximum at one month horizon. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
We select banks from STOXX Global 1800 Banks Index. Among 106 
components of the index we exclude banks with an incomplete or missing array of 
option prices and balance sheets information. The resulting dataset comprehends 
approximately 1,800 quarterly observations from January 2005 to December 2014 
and 50 banks. 
Financial leverage can be briefly summarized as the ratio between firm’s 
borrowed capital and firm’s own capital. For non-financial firms usually total debt 
over total equity is an appropriate measure, but for banks a more accurate measure 
is asset over equity ratio. As numerator we preferred to use total assets, instead of 
Basel regulation risk-weighting, as the former is a more comprehensive measure 
of bank’s exposures. As a numerarie we rely on market capitalization since better 
approximates current equity fair value. 
For each bank we collect option data for different moneyness level and different 
maturities. For moneyness levels (strike-to-spot ratio) we select call and put 
options from 0.80 to 1.20 and for maturities we chose options lasting from 3 
month to 12 months. Call and put option with moneyness close to 1 are defined 
ATM option, call (put) with moneyness above 1.10 (below 0.90) are defined 
OTM. The approach in selecting ATM and OTM moneyness levels is consistent 
with Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw [2004]. Options and stocks data are 
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obtained from Bloomberg and implied volatility prices represent daily average 
value of market trades. After averaging across maturities we build quarterly 
observation by taking the mean value for implied volatility during the three 
months period so that we could compare market-based and balance sheet-based 
information. 
Volatility skew is the difference between OTM put and ATM call option 
implied volatility and measures the excess premium paid for purchasing OTM put 
option with respect to ATM call option. Equation (2) defines volatility skew.  
(2) 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝑂𝑇𝑀,𝑝𝑢𝑡
− 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
 
where 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝑂𝑇𝑀,𝑝𝑢𝑡
 is the implied volatility for an OTM put option, stock i at time 
t and 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 is the implied volatility for ATM call option on stock i at time t.  
Volatility spread is defined in Equation (3) as the difference between ATM call 
option implied volatilities and ATM put option implied volatilities of. 
(3) 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 − 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑝𝑢𝑡
  
 
where i and t represent the same variables in Eq. (2). Volatility spread aims to 
capture departures from put-call parity state due to current market condition. 
Positive values of 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 depict a condition of more expensiveness call option 
to put option hence a traders’ expectation of future positive return on the stock i, 
we are interested in how this excess premium interacts with bank’s leverage.  
Finally we identify Variance Risk Premia (VRP) in Eq. (4) as the difference 
between long-term ATM call implied volatility levels (computed as the average 
between 6 and 12 months to maturity options) and yearly historical realized 
volatility. 
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(4) 𝑣𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 − 𝑟𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
 
Where 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 is the implied volatility for long term ATM call option on 
stock i at time t and  𝑟𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = √∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗
260
𝑗=1
4
 is the realized volatility from daily log-
returns for stock i and quarter t. Due to unavailability of vast intraday dataset on 
Bloomberg, computing realized volatility from intraday return – which is a better 
proxy of the integrated volatility – has been impossible. A positive VRP indicates 
that traders are pricing a premium on stock’s volatility for the future with respect 
to the historical performance. 
Regression analysis is performed on a panel dataset of 50 banks from 2005 to 
2014 for a total of 1,800 quarterly observations. Equation (5) presents the general 
model for addressing the effect of option implied volatility risk measure on 
changes in bank’s leverage. 
(5) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 represents the leverage measure for bank i, in quarter t, and 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is 
the option implied volatility risk measure (either skew, spread, VRP or realized 
volatility) for bank i at time t-1, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
  is a dummy variable equal to one if 
quarter t happens during financial crisis (from Q3 2007 to Q1 2009) and zero 
otherwise, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
  allows us to clean the analysis for any misbehavior of 
dependent variable during the Financial Crisis and 𝐗𝑡
  is a vector of control 
variables. 
As a robusteness check we also controlled for contemporaneous effect by 
analyzing changes in leverage and in volatility measures, Equation (6) specifies 
the model.  
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(6) ∆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
 
Where ∆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of changes in volatility risk measure (skew, spread, 
VRP or realized volatility) for bank i at time t. 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dataset of banks and their more 
relevant balance sheet items. Table 2 depicts the correlation among the considered 
variables. 
 
TABLE 1 —  SUMMARY OF BANKS 
The dataset consists in quarterly observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks 
from 2005 to 2014. PBV is the price-to-book-value, ROA is the return on assets, NPA-to-assets is the ratio of 
non-performing assets over bank’s total assets, Dyield is bank’s dividend yield in % term, Market leverage is 
given by 1- asset-to-market-cap ratio, Book leverage is given by 1- asset-to-book-equity ratio and NPACR 
Leverage is a measure of leverage based on NPACR proposed by Chernykh and Cole [2014] and is given by 1-
(equity + loan loss reserves- non-performing assets)/total assets. 
 Mean Median St Dev Min Max 
PBV 1.3111 1.1357 1.1517 0.2405 13.54 
ROA 0.533 0.550 0.816 0.000 0.880 
NPA-to-assets 2.30% 1.00% 3.13% 0.10% 34.19% 
Dyield 3.91 3.36 3.35 0.13 9.37 
Market leverage 91% 93% 9% 45% 99% 
Book leverage 93% 94% 4% 85% 98.5% 
NPACR Leverage 93% 95% 6% 86% 98% 
      
 
Table 2 reports correlation among market and balance sheet variables for banks. 
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TABLE 2 — CORRELATIONS 
The dataset consists in quarterly observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks from 2005 to 2014.  
 Log(Assets) 
Log(Dep
osits) PBV 
NPL/Asse
ts 
Mkt 
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
NPACR 
Leverage Skew Spread RV VRP 
Loan Loss 
Res 
Log(Assets) 1.000 0.941 -0.142 -0.051 0.384 0.328 0.235 0.104 0.039 0.086 -0.069 0.625 
Log(Deposits) 0.941 1.000 -0.098 -0.041 0.389 0.151 0.081 0.132 0.036 0.059 -0.046 0.579 
PBV -0.142 -0.098 1.000 -0.596 -0.354 0.107 -0.019 0.076 -0.056 -0.438 0.383 -0.350 
NPL/Assets -0.051 -0.041 -0.596 1.000 0.239 -0.145 0.056 -0.045 -0.038 0.332 -0.313 0.341 
Mkt Leverage 0.384 0.389 -0.354 0.239 1.000 0.217 0.263 0.026 0.057 0.283 -0.249 0.290 
Book Leverage 0.328 0.151 0.107 -0.145 0.217 1.000 0.946 -0.007 -0.038 0.040 -0.035 0.145 
NPACR Leverage 0.235 0.081 -0.019 0.056 0.263 0.946 1.000 0.007 -0.066 0.134 -0.136 0.128 
Skew 0.104 0.132 0.076 -0.045 0.026 -0.007 0.007 1.000 0.270 0.155 -0.166 0.069 
Spread 0.039 0.036 -0.056 -0.038 0.057 -0.038 -0.066 0.270 1.000 0.012 0.015 0.031 
RV 0.086 0.059 -0.438 0.332 0.283 0.040 0.134 0.155 0.012 1.000 -0.983 0.200 
VRP -0.069 -0.046 0.383 -0.313 -0.249 -0.035 -0.136 -0.166 0.015 -0.983 1.000 -0.143 
Loan Loss Res 0.625 0.579 -0.350 0.341 0.290 0.145 0.128 0.069 0.031 0.200 -0.143 1.000 
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Table 3 describes the principal statistics for all volatility risk measure. Skews 
exhibit an overall expensiveness of OTM put option compared to ATM call for all 
levels of moneyness and for all options time to maturity. In specific, the shorter is 
the option’s maturity the larger is the skew. Traders use lower moneyness option 
to hedge themselves against large drawdowns in stock’s price thanks to their 
relative cheapness and rely on shorter term options for liquidity reasons. Spread is 
generally shifted towards positive values, showing a relative more expensiveness 
for ATM call than for ATM put and as already pointed out for skew, shorter term 
options exhibit greater spreads. 
 
TABLE 3 — VOLATILITY RISK MEASURES 
 Skew 
Maturity 3 months Short term 6 months 12 months Long term 
Mean 5.74 3.62 2.95 1.97 1.18 
Standard deviation 6.14 3.21 2.79 3.04 4.32 
5th percentile -0.06 -0.18 -0.37 -1.06 -3.16 
25th percentile 3.10 2.23 1.85 1.11 0.55 
50th percentile 5.34 3.64 3.02 2.14 1.55 
75th percentile 7.60 4.97 4.12 2.92 2.20 
  
 Spread 
Maturity 3 months Short term 6 months 12 months Long term 
Mean 2.27 1.53 1.25 0.70 0.17 
Standard deviation 3.49 2.59 2.45 2.92 3.68 
5th percentile -0.95 -0.98 -1.20 -2.05 -4.05 
25th percentile 1.05 0.77 0.57 0.13 -0.24 
50th percentile 2.16 1.56 1.31 0.91 0.63 
75th percentile 3.21 2.25 1.92 1.38 1.07 
      
  
Maturity VRP 6 months VRP 12 months RV 
Mean 2.27  1.53  1.25 
Standard deviation 3.49  2.59  2.45 
5th percentile -0.95  -0.98  -1.20 
25th percentile 1.05  0.77  0.57 
50th percentile 2.16  1.56  1.31 
75th percentile 3.21  2.25  1.92 
      
 
Table 4 illustrates results from Eq. (5). Univariate model shows that volatility 
skew is statistically significant and produces a reduction in banks’ market 
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leverage for next quarter. This means that an increase in perceived risk (given by 
an increase in OTM put option price without a corresponding increase in ATM 
call prices) envisages higher costs to raise equity in case of distress for the bank, 
hence force a deleverage in bank’s assets in order to avoid these costs. Realized 
volatility also produces a reduction in bank’s leverage. However when Skew and 
RV are both regressed on dependent variable, the former use to soak up all the 
negative effect on leverage. This inconsistency in RV’s sign forces us to declass 
the realized volatility measure as a driver for market leverage with respect to the 
other measure. On the other hand, any increase in volatility spread depicts a more 
flourishing business and delivers an increase in market leverage and VRP as well 
seems to drive an increase in market leverage. Finally, it is worth notice how 
running a regression with both Skew and Spread, as we did in model (7), 
increases the statistical significance for the latter variable, as if the tail risk 
component of Skew somehow mix up univariate Spread model (2). 
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TABLE 4 — REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY RISK MEASURES 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (5). The model measures the effect of implied 
volatility risk measures (volatility skew, volatility spread, realized volatility and variance risk premia) on next 
quarter banks’ market leverage. Volatility skews are obtained from the difference between 80% OTM put 
implied volatility and ATM call implied volatility for a 3 months-to-maturity contract. Volatility spread is the 
difference between implied volatility for ATM call and ATM put for a 6 months-to-maturity option. RV 
(Realized Volatility) is the sum of squared daily stock returns and Variance Risk Premia is the difference 
between ATM call 6 months to maturity option implied volatility and annualized realized volatility. Market 
leverage is given by 1- market-capitalization-over-assets ratio. The dataset consists in quarterly observation on 
50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks from 2005 to 2014 for a total of approximately 
1,800 observations. In order to deal with heteroskedaticity and serial correlation issues standard errors are 
clustered at bank’s level. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent 
level. 
 Market leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Skew -0.003    -0.003  -0.005 
 -2.30    -2.32  -2.59 
Spread  0.001    0.0015 0.004 
  1.91    1.98 2.75 
RV   -0.014  0.050 -0.010 0.04 
   -4.65  2.76 -3.69 2.06 
VRP    0.002    
    4.53    
R sq 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
 
Table 5 shows the model in Eq. (5) when all control variables are included. The 
selected control variable accounts for firm’s size, profitability, dividend payout 
policy, reliance on short term borrowing as a source of financing, assets’ quality 
and the Financial Crisis period. Adding control variables to the model does not 
change neither the statistical nor the economic significance of our volatility risk 
measures. Skew and RV still have a negative effect on next quarter market 
leverage whereas Spread and VRP have a positive effect. On the other hand, 
checking for control variable allow us to further investigate which factor 
ultimately affects banks’ capital structure and to show how capital regulation 
plays a second order role in determining it. Beside 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠) which collects 
the size effect and grows in line with banks’ leverage, we see that profitability of 
the bank is somehow inversely related to leverage for different profitability 
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ratios.
2
 Other variables which positively affect banks’ leverage are the dividend 
yields, the reliance on short term financing and the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total assets. 
  
 
2
 by regressing bank’s operating margin instead of Return on Asset we found the same negative relationship.  
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TABLE 5 —REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON VOLATILITY RISK MEASURES WITH CONTROL VARIABLES 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (5). The model measures the effect of implied 
volatility risk measures (volatility skew, volatility spread, realized volatility and variance risk premia) on next 
quarter banks’ market leverage. Volatility skews are obtained from the difference between 80% OTM put 
implied volatility and ATM call implied volatility for a 3 months-to-maturity contract. Volatility spread is the 
difference between implied volatility for ATM call and ATM put for a 6 months-to-maturity option. Realized 
volatility is the sum of squared daily stock returns and Variance Risk Premia is the difference between ATM 
call 6 months to maturity option implied volatility and annualized realized volatility. Market leverage is given 
by 1- market-capitalization-over-assets ratio. Crisis is a dummy which identifies whether the observation falls 
within Q3 2007 to Q1 2009 time frame. Log(deposits) is the logarithm of deposits in 2010 USD. ROA is return-
on-asset ratio, Dyield represent the dividend yield, Log(St Borrow) is the logarithm of short term bank’s 
financing operations and NPL-to-assets is the ratio of non-performing loans over bank’s total assets. The dataset 
consists in quarterly observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks from 2005 to 
2014 for a total of approximately 1,800 observations. In order to deal with heteroskedaticity and serial 
correlation issues standard errors are clustered at bank’s level. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically 
significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
 Market leverage 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Skew -0.0018     -0.0029 
 -2.12     -2.32 
Spread  0.0004    0.0022 
  1.52    2.43 
RV   -0.0116   0.001 
   -4.45   1.08 
VRP    0.017   
    4.45   
Crisis 0.0780 0.120 0.1080 0.1063 0.1200 0.0740 
 2.20 2.90 4.24 3.76 4.17 2.48 
Log(Deposits) 0.0271 0.0490 0.0416 0.0395 0.0430 0.0262 
 2.10 3.66 6.61 4.46 6.66 2.07 
ROA -0.1296 -0.17 -0.021 -0.019 -0.2130 -0.0126 
 -4.12 -4.09 -5.23 -4.96 -4.64 -4.17 
Dyield 0.0019 0.0021 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
 4.87 3.68 4.21 3.56 4.08 4.10 
Log(St Borrow) 0.0095 0.0041 0.0045 0.0048 0.0030 0.0092 
 2.68 1.16 1.97 1.58 1.27 2.58 
NPL-to-assets 0.2505 0.4107 0.3600 0.3878 0.3934 0.2613 
 1.33 1.81 3.04 2.28 3.14 1.42 
Constant 0.4014 0.2723 0.3660 0.3899 0.3566 0.4740 
 2.62 1.48 4.09 3.07 3.94 2.68 
       
R-sq 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.29 
 
In Table 6 we conduct a robustness check to verify whether the effect of 
volatility risk measures on market leverage is somehow disproved when we deal 
with changes in variables rather than level (or logarithm). Evidences confirm what 
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we already highlighted in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 6 confirms that changes in 
Skew (Spread) negatively (positively) affect future changes in market leverage 
and as we already discovered in model (7) when Skew and Spread are both in the 
regression – as in model (20) – the predictive power of these two increases. 
On the other hand, changes in RV seems to produce a deleverage in firms assets 
and does not help in clarifying the effectiveness of this variable. 
 
TABLE 6 — REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR CHANGES IN VOLATILITY RISK MEASURES - 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (6). The model measures the effect of changes 
in implied volatility risk measures (volatility skew, volatility spread, realized volatility and variance risk 
premia) on changes in current quarter banks’ market leverage. Volatility skews are obtained from the difference 
between 80% OTM put implied volatility and ATM call implied volatility for a 3 months-to-maturity contract. 
Volatility spread is the difference between implied volatility for ATM call and ATM put for a 6 months-to-
maturity option. Realized volatility is the sum of squared daily stock returns and Variance Risk Premia is the 
difference between ATM call 6 months to maturity option implied volatility and annualized realized volatility. 
Market leverage is given by 1- market-capitalization-over-assets ratio. The dataset consists in quarterly 
observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks from 2005 to 2014 for a total of 
approximately 1,800 observations. In order to deal with heteroskedaticity and serial correlation issues standard 
errors are clustered at bank’s level. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below 
percent level. 
 ∆Market leverage 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
∆Skew -0.080    -0.070  -0.140 
 -2.26    -2.21  -2.45 
∆Spread  0.010    0.010 0.110 
  0.57    0.56 2.45 
∆Realized 
vol 
  0.050  0.090 0.010 0.0100 
   3.18  4.57 3.04 4.52 
∆VRP    -0.002    
    -1.08    
        
R-sq 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.10 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we addressed how volatility risk measure from option prices 
influences banks’ leverage. In order to do that, we assumed that banks’ capital 
structure is driven by some balance sheet characteristic and not solely determined 
by capital regulation. The analysis is run using as exogenous variables volatility 
skew, spread, VRP and realized volatility and as endogenous variable banks’ 
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market leverage, which is defined as total assets over market capitalization. The 
model is performed both in univariate and multivariate regression fixed effect 
framework. In multivariate analysis we include different control variables from 
banks’ balance sheet. Overall, the most effective implied volatility risk measure 
seems to be volatility skew, which negatively affects market leverage. 
Our findings show a strong and significant negative relationship between skew 
and next quarter market leverage. This outcome suggests that, as perceived risk 
increases, the probability for banks to incur in higher refinancing costs when an 
additional raise in equity is needed increases as well. Hence, banks wisely 
deleverage their business and generate a safety buffer. On the other hand, 
volatility spread which captures any upside risk is positively related to bank’s 
leverage however this relationship emerges clearly only when is regressed 
together with volatility skew. VRP and Spread are positively related to leverage 
while RV fails to deliver consistent estimates. 
Our main conclusion is that banks’ capital structure although different form 
non-financial firms and subject to strong regulation does not solely depends on 
mandatory minimum capital requirements. Actually, to the above mentioned risk 
measures are yet another determinant factor in shaping banks’ market leverage 
and implied volatility measures due to their characteristics – first of all being a 
forward looking measure – suit well this role. Above all the analyzed volatility 
risk measure, skew is by far more closely related to bank’s perceived risk and 
useful in determining next quarter leverage. 
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Chapter III – Banks’ liquidity ratio, credit risk and other market 
based risk measures in periods of financial distress 
By GIULIO ANSELMI 
In this paper we investigate the role of liquidity in banks lending 
activity and how liquidity provision is related to bank’s credit risk 
and others macroeconomic and idiosyncratic market-based risk 
measures, such as bank’s implied volatility skew from options 
traded on the market and realized volatility from futures contract on 
three months LIBOR, during periods of global financial distress. 
Credit risk is given by the ratio between loan loss reserves and total 
assets. We find that losses from lending activity forces banks to 
build up new liquidity provisions only during period of financial 
distress. On the other hand, during period of financial stability, new 
loans are crippled from losses, experienced by the bank, in the 
previous quarter. Regarding liquidity ratio, we discovered that, in 
good times, credit risk reduces liquidity ratio and do not trigger 
liquid asset demand for banks while, in bad times, this demand for 
liquid asset is suddenly switched on and the more reserves from 
loan losses the bank has, the more it cleans its balance sheet from 
long term commitments in order to replenish it cash and short term 
securities. When we control for market based risk measures we 
evidence that both implied volatility skew and LIBOR’s realized 
volatility are negatively related with liquidity ratio and are useful in 
predicting a distress in bank’s liquidity holdings. 
* Giulio Anselmi, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo Gemelli, 1, Milano, Italy, giulio.anselmi@unicatt.it  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we analyze the role of liquidity in banks’ lending activity and how 
liquidity provision is related to bank’s credit risk, as well as to others 
macroeconomic and idiosyncratic market-based risk measures, when we have 
liquidity issues in the inter-banking market and during periods of global financial 
distress. During 2007-2009 Financial Crisis banking sector froze its inter-banking 
activity experiencing a severe drawdown in banks’ liquidity and some defaults. 
Since then, liquidity provisioning became a critical principle to account for by 
everyone involved in loans market, for commercial and investment banks, central 
banks and other regulators. In order to set thing back to normality central banking 
authorities implemented broad measure to provide liquidity to the commercial and 
non-commercial banking sector. Meanwhile regulators drafted a liquidity 
coverage criteria to prevent future liquidity distress – both in inter-banking 
activity and in customers’ deposits – and to reinforce banking sector stability, 
supporting capital regulations standards where they are less effective. 
To address the issue Basel Committee’s presented the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) which has the objective to promote short-term resilience of the liquidity 
risk profile of banks. The principle behind LCR is that banks must hold a 
minimum high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) buffer portfolio that can be easily and 
immediately converted into cash in private markets to meet sudden liquidity needs 
for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. This 30-days window buffer gives 
banks, supervisors and central banks a sufficient amount of time to implement any 
corrective action needed to restore liquidity and refurbish a stable business 
environment. Liquid capital provisions may be useful for managing a bank run 
and address a deleveraging process by a bank’s with excessive risk-taking activity 
and/or with a severe borrowers’ insolvency, as we experienced during recent 
financial crisis. An over leveraged firm, which is suddenly exposed to an erosion 
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in its asset quality, would incur in extremely high costs when raises more capital 
to offset the losses. By detaining a buffer of liquidity reserves the bank can cope 
with a short-term illiquidity phase derived from the losses without raising new – 
expensive – equity. 
In this study we focus on cash and other marketable short term assets as a proxy 
for liquidity buffer and we investigate how these assets relate to other risk 
measure. Following Cornett et al. [2011] we broaden the analysis by controlling 
for credit risk measures and market based measures, while relying on a dataset of 
mostly Global SIFI rather than solely belonging to the US. By focusing on the 
main features that produces changes in liquidity provision and in lending activity 
they discovered that banks relying more on stable sources of financing, such as 
core deposit and equity capital financing, continued to lend relative to other banks 
with a less stable source of financing. Also, they found out that banks with more 
illiquid assets on their balance sheets increased their asset liquidity and reduced 
lending in the next quarter in order to balance out their asset structure and 
increase their liquidity provision. 
First, we restate their model by adding as a new exogenous variable credit risk, 
than, we investigate how liquidity ratio is influenced by additional risk measures 
inherited by the market (such as option implied volatility skew, which captures 
trader’s expectations about bank’s idiosyncratic features and realized volatility on 
three months LIBOR futures, which reflects the general macroeconomic 
environment). If these market-based risk measures do influence banks’ liquidity 
then future liquidity provisions could be eligible to play a part in a broader market 
discipline-based monitoring activity. As a robustness check on the efficiency of 
these market-based risk measure we implemented also a regression analysis 
having as a dependent variable bank’s z-score, which is already identified by 
previous literature as a good risk measure to examine the effects of the financial 
assistance on banks’ risk-taking behavior.  
– 66 –  
 
This paper is organized as follow, Section 1 is the introduction, Section 2 
presents previous literature related to the topic, Section 3 describes the data and 
the methodology used in the analysis, Section 4 illustrates the results and 
robustness check analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Previous literature 
On loans growth and liquidity issues, Ivashina and Scarfstein [2010] show that 
new loans to large borrowers fell by 37% during the peak period of the Financial 
Crisis relative to the prior three-month period and by 68% relative to the peak of 
the credit boom. New lending for real investment fell to the same extent as new 
lending for restructuring. Banks that have access to deposit financing cut their 
lending less than banks with less access to deposit financing. 
Diamond and Rajan [2000] state that greater bank capital reduces liquidity 
creation but enables the bank to survive and to avoid distress. Also, banks with 
different amounts of capital extract different amounts of repayment from 
borrowers and the optimal bank capital structure trades off the effects of bank 
capital on liquidity creation, the expected costs of bank distress, and the ease of 
forcing borrower repayment. 
Thakor [2014] highlights that in a cross-section analysis on banks higher capital 
is associated with higher lending activity, higher liquidity creation and higher 
probability of surviving the crisis. On the other hand, lower capital in banking 
leads to higher systemic risk and a higher probability of a government-funded 
bailout. 
Calomiris [2012] states that cash reserves requirements could play a role of 
broader prudential tool than just for addressing liquidity risk. But focusing on 
cash ratios rather than capital ratio is subject to a tradeoff. By relying on cash 
ratios we deal with adverse-selection cost of raising equity, a limited verifiability 
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of loan outcomes is limited, when and the moral-hazard resulting from costly or 
postponed loss recognition but we are subject to a higher opportunity cost by 
providing high cash ratio than our lending activity needs. Previous literature 
evidences the need also for non-financial firms to hold cash as a precautionary 
tools see Mortal and Reisel [2013]. 
Calomiris et al. [2015] further investigate cash reserve requirements and argue 
that, while during stable period just deposit insurance may be optimal, during 
liquidity shocks period a cash reserve requirement must exist to avoid free riding 
behavior in the interbank market. 
Mandatory capital requirements provide capital buffer to absorb losses on 
banks’ balance sheets and to limit risk taking in banking sector, but their 
restoration could be painful to achieve for a bank which faces high costs for 
raising new capital. This limitation could be amended, rather than from an 
increase in equity, by holding more liquid assets. On capital regulation Berger et 
al. [1995] investigate the role of capital for financial institutions and how market-
generated capital requirements differ from regulatory requirements and Santos 
[2001] reviews the literature on the design of the financial system and bank 
capital regulation presenting a list of the market failures that justify banking 
regulation. Barth et al. [2005], Berger et al. [2008] and Brewer et al. [2008] 
observe that bank capital’s levels are higher than what regulation dictates opening 
up for discussion about what determines this buffers. On non-binding capital 
requirements and banks’ capital structure flexibility see Flannery [1994], Myers 
and Rajan [1998], Diamond and Rajan [2000] and Allen et al. [2011]. On the 
other hand Flannery and Nikolova [2004] and Gropp [2004] offer a survey on 
non-binding capital requirements in a market discipline framework. 
Brunnermeier et al. [2008] propose some distinctions between regulatory and 
market based capital while Chernyk and Cole [2014] test the predictive power of 
several alternative measures of bank capital adequacy in identifying US bank 
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failures during the recent crisis period. They found that the non-performing asset 
coverage ratio (NPACR) significantly outperforms Basel-based ratios throughout 
the crisis period by accounting for both banking risks and asset quality and 
aligning capital and credit risk, eliminating banking management incentives to 
mask capital deficiency and allowing to account for various time period and 
cross-country provisioning rules. 
Sorokina and Thornton [2014] show that loan market competition and loan 
portfolio diversification reduce leverage of the banks and excess leverage, that 
short-term borrowing of banks increases in low market liquidity conditions and 
banks’ capital structure significantly affects capital structure of the firms in the 
broad economy, since an increase in banks’ holding of capital reduces firms’ 
leverage. 
Valencia [2011] focus on how monetary policy rates affect bank risk-taking and 
its leverage by showing that under limited liability a decrease in interest rate 
produces an increase in banks profitability which could lead to take excessive risk 
and leverage. 
On the relationship between market returns and capital ratios during the 
financial crisis Demirguc-Kunt et al. [2010] study whether better capitalized 
banks experienced higher stock return. They find out that before the crisis 
differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns while during the 
financial crisis a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market 
performance and relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when 
capital is measured by Tier I capital to total asset leverage ratio. 
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3. Data and Methodology  
We build the dataset from quarterly observations on 50 banks belonging to 
STOXX Global 1800 Banks Index for a total of approximately 1,800 observations 
from January 2005 to December 2014. 
In order to capture how banks adjust their liquidity provisions and lending 
activity in next quarter we select as dependent variable changes in liquid assets 
and loans activity standardized by bank’s total assets. In addition the interaction 
between exogenous variables and TED spread allows us to see how liquidity 
provisions and lending activity changes when inter-banking market is under 
stress. Equation 1 and 2 describe the model. 
(1) 
∆𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
(2)  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 
 +𝛽4𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where, as liquid assets, we use cash and short term marketable securities, and 
as illiquid assets we use long term investments, 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 is expression on 
the insolvency risk that bank is bearing and is given by the ratio between loan loss 
reserves and total assets, while 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 is the difference between 3 months 
LIBOR and the 3 months treasury bills yield rate for bank i at time t-1, and 
capture the stress on the interbank market. 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 tell us correspondingly how 
banks more exposed to illiquid assets and insolvencies adapt their liquidity 
holdings in next quarter when the inter-banking activity is normal, while 𝛽2 and 
𝛽4 allow us to study the role of these variables when the inter-banking market is 
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under stress. 𝛽5 and 𝛽6 focus on how better capitalized banks adjust their liquidity 
needs. 
On the other hand, when we are not interested in changes, but we want to 
address overall levels of liquidity and lending and how they are affected from 
market volatility risk measures, we shift to levels. To measure banks’ overall 
liquidity ratio we chose the ratio between liquid assets (which is given by the sum 
of cash, cash equivalents and short term assets) and total assets. Equation (3) 
presents the general model. 
(3)  𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡
∗ 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑉𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅,𝑡−1
𝑐 + 𝛽5𝐗𝑡
 + 𝜺𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 represents the liquidity ratio for bank i, in quarter t, which is equal 
the ratio between cash plus other short term securities assets and bank’s total 
asset, 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 is the volatility skew and is equal to the difference between OTM 
put and ATM call option implied volatility and measures the over premium paid 
for purchasing OTM put option with respect to ATM call option. Equation (5) 
defines volatility skew.  
(4) 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝑂𝑇𝑀,𝑝𝑢𝑡
− 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
 
where 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝑂𝑇𝑀,𝑝𝑢𝑡
 is the implied volatility for an OTM put option, stock i at time 
t and 𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
 𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 is the implied volatility for ATM call option on stock i at time t. 
𝑅𝑉𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅,𝑡−1
𝑐 = √∑ 𝑟𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅,𝑗
260
𝑗=1
4
 is the realized volatility from daily log-returns 
for futures contract on 3 months LIBOR for country c (whom bank i belongs to) 
and quarter t-1. Realized volatility calculated from futures contract on a interbank 
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lending interest rate gives us several advantages in comparison to realized 
volatility on bank’s i stocks: (i) it is not focused on bank’s i idiosyncratic risks but 
rather captures banking sector’s and macroeconomics’ issues (ii) since derives 
from a quoted futures rather than inter-banking dealers average rate it means that 
is a direct expression of traders’ sentiment about where will be the underlying 
LIBOR in three months’ time and this forward looking relationship comes in our 
help when we have to weigh the forecasting ability of this variable.
3
 Due to 
unavailability of vast intraday dataset on Bloomberg computing realized volatility 
from intraday return – which is a better proxy of the integrated volatility – was 
impossible. 
Using option-based or futures-based risk measures to address the change in 
liquidity delivers several advantages with respect to accounting measures. First of 
all, they are forward looking measure based on traders’ expectations on equity 
future prices rather than accounting based measure which are backward looking 
and lagged indicators. Second, prices are computed at much higher frequencies 
than traditional measures, hence they changes quickly as market conditions 
changes and can help in delivering informational content about banks’ capital 
structure or about sudden fluctuations in macroeconomic environment. RV 
quickly absorbs any spikes in the quotation of the underlying market. 
Also, options market is a suitable environment for informed traders thanks to 
the high use of leverage, the asymmetric payoff and no constraint in short selling. 
Options give the opportunity but not the obligation to buy or sell a specific asset 
at a specific price within – or at – a specific point in time. Traders operate in 
option market by quoting their implied volatilities for different maturities and 
moneyness according to their view on future stock’s returns. The result of this 
 
3
 To be more specific the measure is only partially forward looking since represents the sum of squared daily returns of 
the previous quarter instead a better forward looking measure would have been one based on implied volatility from option 
on LIBOR. 
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trading produces volatility skews, smirks and spreads which get away from Black 
and Scholes [1973] environment of constant volatility across all maturity and all 
moneyness. 
As a robustness check we run the same model in Eq. (3) but selecting as 
dependent variable bank’s z-score which is a measure of stability. The z-score is 
the sum of the quarterly ROA return-on-assets and equity to assets ratio, divided 
by the standard deviation of the return on assets, see Roy [1952] to measure bank 
solvency. The z-score indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s 
rate of return on assets can fall in a single period before it becomes insolvent. A 
higher z-score signals a lower probability of bank insolvency. 
OLS fixed effect regression analysis is performed on a panel dataset of 50 
banks from 2005 to 2014 for a total of 1,800 quarterly observations. In order to 
cope with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation issues standard errors are 
clustered at bank level as suggested by Peterson [2009] and quarterly and bank’s 
effect are implemented. 
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3. Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dataset describing the considered 
variables while Table 2 depicts the correlation for the very same variables. 
 
TABLE 1 —  SUMMARY OF BANKS 
The dataset consists in quarterly observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks 
from 2005 to 2014.  Balance sheet items are weighted over total assets.  
 Obs Mean STD Min Max 
Loans 1,915 0.582 0.412 0.091 0.860 
Cash 1,976 0.026 0.035 0.000 0.302 
Cash + ST securities 1,950 0.097 0.081 0.000 0.355 
LT investments 1,743 0.082 0.169 0.001 0.377 
Deposits 2,009 0.494 0.306 0.155 0.802 
Loan Loss Reserves 1,888 0.014 0.015 0.001 0.343 
Total equity 2,020 0.070 0.041 0.010 0.174 
Interbank assets 1,869 0.060 0.062 0.005 0.272 
Skew 1,342 -6.761 4.291 -33.789 9.844 
ROA 1,950 0.533 0.816 0.000 0.880 
ROA STD 1,667 0.255 0.370 0.006 5.352 
 
Table 2 reports correlation among market and balance sheet variables for banks. 
 
TABLE 2 — CORRELATIONS 
The dataset consists in quarterly observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks 
from 2005 to 2014.  
 
Liquidity 
ratio 
Credit 
risk z-score 
equity-
to-asset 
ratio 
TED Skew 
LT 
invest 
Loan 
Loss 
Reserve
s 
Liquidity ratio 1.000        
Credit risk 0.208 1.000       
z-score 0.082 -0.257 1.000      
equity-to-asset 
ratio 
0.311 0.558 -0.026 1.000     
TED -0.008 -0.067 -0.130 0.013 1.000    
Skew -0.091 0.004 -0.047 -0.021 -0.033 1.000   
LT investment 0.293 0.387 -0.094 0.581 0.039 0.240 1.000  
Loan Loss 
Reserves 
0.208 1.000 -0.257 0.558 -0.067 0.004 0.387 1.000 
 
Table 3 illustrates the results from Eq. (1) and (2). As already stated by Cornett 
et al. [2011] banks with more long term investments are forced to build up their 
liquid assets both in period of financial distress and in normal times. Better 
capitalized banks also increase their liquid assets. Banks with higher credit risk 
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are forced to dismiss long term securities and build up cash reserves only when 
we are in a period of inter-banking stress. Regarding new loans commitment we 
can state that banks with more illiquid investments tend to reduce their loans 
approval in next quarter when inter-banking market is working properly. We 
cannot infer the same thing during period of financial stress. Better capitalized 
bank continue their lending activity without any trouble and higher credit risk 
levels force banks to reduce the amount of lending. 
 
TABLE 3 — ADDRESSING CREDIT RISK MEASURE EFFECTS FOR LIQUIDITY AND LOANS 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (1) and (2). The model measures the effect of 
credit risk (measured as the ratio between loan loss reserves and total assets) on changes in next quarter banks’ 
liquid assets in model (1) and in new loans in model (2). The dataset consists in quarterly observation on 50 
publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks from 2005 to 2014 for a total of approximately 
1,800 observations. In order to deal with heteroskedaticity and serial correlation issues standard errors are 
clustered at bank’s level. Balance sheet items are weighted over total assets at t-1. Bold figures represent 
coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below percent level. 
 (1) (2) 
numeraire: assets (t-1) Δliquidassets/assets (t-1) Δloans/assets (t-1) 
Illiquid assets (t-1) 0.5843 -0.1298 
 2.79 -2.89 
Illiquid assets*TED (t-1) 0.2913 -0.0596 
 2.44 -1.25 
Capital (t-1) 1.4432 0.4176 
 2.22 3.73 
Capital*TED (t-1) -0.1984 0.2256 
 -0.54 1.33 
Credit risk (t-1) 0.7705 -0.5628 
 1.07 -3.41 
Credit risk*TED (t-1) 4.0917 -0.4835 
 3.64 -1.48 
Log(Assets) (t-1) 0.0393 -0.01627 
 1.28 -4.17 
Log(Assets)*TED (t-1) -0.003 -0.0029 
 -1.92 -1.09 
R-squared 0.48 0.09 
   
obs 1511 1665 
F-stat 5.63 8.07 
 
 
Table 4 focuses on the effect of credit risk and market risk measures on bank’s 
overall liquidity ratio as presented in Eq. (3) and on bank’s overall lending 
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activity as presented in Eq. (4). As a robustness check model (5) depicts the same 
analysis on z-score. Regarding overall liquidity during period of financial stability 
high levels of loan loss reserves do not immediately bind the bank to provide new 
cash in order to increase liquidity provisions, actually the bank decreases their 
liquidity ratio since is not under pressure from either depositors, investors or other 
financial intermediaries. But, when though times come being overly exposed to 
loan losses forces the bank to liquidate other assets and replenish its liquidity 
provisions. Skew since measures traders’ expectation on downward movement on 
bank’s stock is negatively related with liquidity ratio. As the bank is expected to 
suffer from liquidity vanishing, traders expect a drop in stock’s prices, hence 
OTM put option became severely more expensive than ATM call. Finally, LIBOR 
realized volatility captures distress in inter-banking market and hence is 
negatively related to liquidity ratio. 
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TABLE 4 —CREDIT RISK AND MARKET VOLATILITY RISK MEASURE 
This table shows the main results from regression analysis of Eq. (3). The model measures the effect of credit 
risk (measured as the ratio between loan loss reserves and total assets), volatility skew derived from options on 
bank’s stock and realized volatility from quotes on Libor 3 months futures on bank’s liquid ratio (which is given 
by the cash and short term securities divided by total assets) in model (3) and(4) and on bank’s z-score (given 
by the sum of ROA and equity-to-asset ratio standardized by ROA standard deviation) in model (5) and (6). As 
control variable we identified equity-to-asset ratio and Log(Assets). The dataset consists in quarterly 
observation on 50 publicly traded banks from STOXX GLOBAL 1800 Banks from 2005 to 2014 for a total of 
approximately 1,800 observations. In order to deal with heteroskedaticity and serial correlation issues standard 
errors are clustered at bank’s level. Bold figures represent coefficients statistically significant at a 5 or below 
percent level. 
all lagged at (t-1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
Credit risk -0,7109  -2,2258  
 -3,5  -3,41  
Credit risk*TED 0,602  -0,7833  
 2,65  -1,63  
Skew -0,0011 -0,001 -0,227  
 -2,11 -1,83 -1,64 -0,2196 
LIBOR RV -0,013 -0,00947 -1,5232 -1,96 
 -3,66 -2,16 -2,91 -2,604 
Leverage 0,5027  1,6074 -3,51 
 2,07  4,3  
Leverage*TED 0,056  -0,8614  
 0,46  -2,71  
Log(Assets) 0,0379  0,0081  
 2,19  1,84  
Log(Assets)*TED -0,001  0,0001  
 -1,36  0,83  
R-squared 0,13 0,09 0,16 0,04 
F-stat 4,55 4,00 3,84 4,33 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we studied how credit risk measure interacts with changes in 
liquidity provisions and new loans commitment during period of financial 
stability and financial distress. Losses from lending activity forces banks to build 
up new liquidity provisions only during period of financial distress and cripple 
lending activity during period of financial stability. Looking at the overall bank’s 
liquidity ratio in addition to credit risk measure we implemented market-based 
risk measures such as implied volatility skew from options on bank’s stock and 
realized volatility from LIBOR 3 months futures affect banks liquidity ratio. 
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These two measure enable us to capture market-based risk about bank’s 
idiosyncratic features (with volatility skew) and macroeconomic environment 
(with realized volatility on LIBOR). We discovered that credit risk reduces 
liquidity ratio during stable times and do not trigger any liquid asset demand from 
banks. On the other hand, when we experience period of severe financial distress 
this demand for liquid asset is suddenly switched on and the more reserves from 
loan losses the bank has the more it cleans its balance sheet from long term 
commitments in order to replenish its cash and short term securities. Implied 
volatility skew in negatively related with liquidity ration and predicts a distress in 
bank’s liquidity holdings as traders’ future expectations are translated in OTM put 
option prices. Realized volatility on futures contract on 3 months LIBOR is also 
useful in predicting reduction in liquidity holdings. When we control whether 
these market based variable influence bank’s z-score we find results in line with 
what we expected, credit risk, skew and LIBOR realized volatility all compromise 
bank’s stability. 
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